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ARTICLES
MODERN MASS TORT LITIGATION, PRIOR-
ACTION DEPOSITIONS AND PRACTICE-
SENSITIVE PROCEDURE
MITCHELL A. LOWENTHAL AND HOWARD M. ERICHSON*
INTRODUCTION
p ROCEDURAL rules are not created in a vacuum. They assume a
particular tradition of litigation practice. The Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, notwithstanding their patchwork of amendments
over the years, assume to a large, perhaps too large, extent the tradi-
tion of litigation practice as it existed in 1937, when a litigant was still
a litigant and a lawsuit was still a lawsuit.' However great the tradi-
tion, rules may linger long after that tradition has been displaced.
This is truest where rules affect such rapidly developing areas as com-
plex litigation, in particular, mass tort litigation.
* Mitchell A. Lowenthal is a member and Howard M. Erichson is an associate of
Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton. The authors have represented defendants in the
asbestos, DBCP and L-tryptophan mass tort litigations. The authors thank Kevin
Clermont, Evan Davis, Sara Schotland and Linda Silberman for their comments on
earlier drafts, and Jeff Saxon for his research assistance.
1. See Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts of the United States, 308
U.S. 645 (1937); see also Charles E. Clark & James W. Moore, A New Federal Civil
Procedure, 44 Yale LJ. 387, 392 (1935) ("It must be recognized that procedure is not
an end in itself, but merely a means to an end, a tool rather than a product, and that
procedural rules must be continually reexamined and reformed in order to be kept
workable.").
As relates to mass tort litigation, perhaps it is more accurate to say that the rules
assume the tradition of litigation practice as it existed in the early 1960s, when the
Advisory Committee on Civil Rules and its Reporter, then-professor Benjamin
Kaplan, carefully reassessed issues of aggregate litigation in preparation for the ambi-
tious rule amendments of 1966. See Judith Resnik, Fronz "Cases" to "Litigation", 54
Law & Contemp. Probs. 5, 7-17 (1991). The Federal Rules of Evidence largely as-
sume litigation practice as it existed in 1975, or, to the extent they follow the common
law, a much earlier tradition.
To the extent the rules reflect an anachronistic conception of litigation practice, it is
not the fault of the rulemakers alone. Professor George Priest and Judyth Pendell
point out that most lawyers still perceive Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877), Hadley
v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Ex. 1854), Brown v. Kendall, 60 Mass. (6 Cush.) 292
(1850), and Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928), as the foundations
of our civil liability law, even though
[t]he caseload of the modem civil judge is less likely to be dominated by an
action involving an attempt to collect on a note against land (Pennoyer), or
damages for delay in delivery (Hadley), or for suffering a hit from a stick
(Brown) or a scale (Palsgraf), than by an action involving the joinder of mul-
tiple parties with complex third-party liability claims asserting a causative
link that requires complicated scientific understanding.
George L. Priest & Judyth W. Pendell, Foreword to 54 Law & Contemp. Probs. 1, 1
(1991).
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Perhaps the most cherished assumption that must be reevaluated in
light of the way mass tort litigation is now practiced is the assumption
of independently controlled litigation. Modern mass tort litigation has
witnessed a remarkable growth of interdependence among litigants
who, although not parties to the same "lawsuit," find themselves on
the same side of a "litigation."2 Mass tort litigants with common in-
terests tend to pursue those interests collectively.3 While the growth
of mass tort litigation has been much discussed in the scholarly litera-
ture, as have various formal procedures for aggregating claims,4 insuf-
ficient attention has been given to the profound changes occurring
informally, in particular, the trend toward aggregation through coordi-
nation by same-side counsel.5 In light of the growing interdependence
among litigants to separate actions, the time has come to reassess
rules that assume each litigant is, in terms of litigation control, in-
dependent. One procedural point ripe for such reassessment, and the
point this Article will take as illustrative, is the use of prior-action
depositions.
The story usually runs something like this. A disaster occurs-a
crash, contamination, conflagration, collapse or other calamity-and
dozens, hundreds, maybe thousands of victims seek recompense for
their injuries from the perceived wrongdoer or wrongdoers. Lawsuits
crop up in multiple jurisdictions. Suits are filed in state and federal
2. For an excellent discussion of the trend toward aggregate litigation and some
of its implications, see generally Resnik, supra note 1.
3. For a useful analysis of the costs and benefits of "collective litigation" from the
vantage point of political and economic thought about collective action, see generally
Stephen C. Yeazell, Collective Litigation as Collective Action, 1989 U. Ill. L. Rev. 43.
4. E.g., Complex Litigation Project (ALI, Proposed Final Draft Apr. 5, 1993)
[hereinafter Complex Litigation Project] (recommending a comprehensive set of pro-
cedures for aggregating multiparty, multiforum litigation); Myron J. Bromberg &
Anastasia P. Slowinski, Pay or Play in Mass Torts: Alleviate Backlogs with an Ex-
panded Court System or Joinder Methods for Mass Tort Cases, 45 Rutgers L. Rev. 371(1993) (advocating reform to address court calendar congestion caused by mass tort
cases); Deborah R. Hensler, Resolving Mass Toxic Torts: Myths and Realities, 1989 U.
Ill. L. Rev. 89 (discussing the ongoing debate over aggregation procedures); Alvin B.
Rubin, Mass Torts and Litigation Disasters, 20 Ga. L. Rev. 429 (1986) (discussing the
high costs that mass tort litigation places on consumers and the need for reform);
Symposium, American Law Institute Complex Litigation Project, 54 La. L. Rev. 835(1994) (discussing and critiquing the reforms proposed in the ALI's Complex Litiga-
tion Project); Roger H. Trangsrud, Joinder Alternatives in Mass Tort Litigation, 70
Cornell L. Rev. 779 (1985) [hereinafter Trangsrud, Joinder Alternatives] (urging that
fairness concerns be balanced against efficiency of joinder in mass tort cases); Roger
H. Trangsrud, Mass Trials in Mass Tort Cases: A Dissent, 1989 U. Ill. L. Rev. 69
[hereinafter Trangsrud, Mass Trials] (arguing against use of mass trials to shorten
court calendars); Comment, Procedural Devices for Simplifying Litigation Stemmingfrom a Mass Tort, 63 Yale L.J. 493 (1954) (evaluating major devices for simplifying
mass tort litigation while reconciling defendants' and claimants' conflicting interests).
5. See Resnik, supra note 1, at 39 (noting that informal aggregation mechanisms
"are less visible to the academy" than are formal ones, and that "references to such
activities are more often found in legal newspapers and conferences of lawyers andjudges than in academic journals").
[Vol. 63
MASS TORT LITIGATION
court in a number of states and perhaps around the globe. Despite
the technical independence of each of the multitudinous lawsuits,6 the
whole legal affair is perceived as a single complex litigation: the
breast implant litigation; the L-tryptophan litigation; the MGM Grand
Hotel fire litigation; even the asbestos litigation.7
Quickly, litigation control structures develop. The defendant re-
tains a law firm to handle its defense as lead counsel. That lead coun-
sel in turn hires local counsel in each of the various jurisdictions where
suits are pending or anticipated, establishing what may become a vast,
networked team of defense lawyers. If multiple defendants have been
sued, they may enter into indemnification or other coordination ar-
rangements, further extending the defense counsel network.
Each plaintiff, too, hires counsel. Eventually, dozens of plaintiffs'
lawyers find themselves prosecuting very similar cases. Sensibly, they
coordinate their efforts, establishing a networked team of lawyers on
the plaintiffs' side, with a committee or other vehicle to coordinate
strategy and the exchange of information.
Perhaps plaintiffs' counsel seek class certification to turn the litiga-
tion into a single class action. If so, they likely fail, as courts have
proved reluctant to allow mass tort litigation, especially mass products
liability claims, to proceed as class actions.8 Rather, the litigation
likely proceeds as a number of formally independent cases, but with
litigation control structures that render case management a highly co-
ordinated, collective process. If federal cases are consolidated pursu-
ant to the multidistrict litigation ("MDL") statute,9 any state court
cases remain formally independent, 0 but MDL court-sanctioned
mechanisms render coordination among counsel even more highly
structured than in non-MDL mass tort litigation."
6. The suits are independent only in the absence of a formal mechanism for ag-
gregation, such as class action or consolidation. On the infrequency of mass tort class
actions and the limitations of other joinder methods, see text infra at notes 108-17.
7. In addition, a sampling of mass tort litigation might include the Pan Am Lock-
erbie air crash litigation, the World Trade Center bombing litigation, the diethylstil-
bestrol (DES) litigation, the Union Carbide Bhopal gas disaster litigation, the San
Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel fire litigation, the Bendectin (anti-nausea drug) litigation,
the Agent Orange litigation, the repetitive stress injury litigation, the Bjork-Shiley
heart valve litigation, the tobacco litigation, the dibromochloropropane (DBCP pesti-
cide) litigation, the MIER/29 (anti-cholesterol drug) litigation, the Sioux City air crash
litigation, the Dalkon Shield (contraceptive) litigation, the formaldehyde litigation,
the toxic shock syndrome litigation, the Three Mile Island nuclear accident litigation,
and the Kansas City Hyatt Regency Hotel skywalk collapse litigation.
8. See infra notes 108-10 and accompanying text.
9. 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (Supp. V 1993).
10. See Trangsrud, Joinder Alternatives, supra note 4, at 810. It is possible for a
federal judge and a state judge handling pieces of the same mass tort litigation to
coordinate with each other notwithstanding MDL's inability to reach state court
cases. See id.; Manual for Complex Litigation (Second) §§ 31.31, 33.21 (1985) (herein-
after M.C.L.2d].
11. For example, MDL proceedings almost inevitably produce an organized infra-
structure on each side of the caption, with the establishment of "steering committees"
1995]
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Discovery proceeds in the various individual cases. In the case of
one plaintiff, let's call her P1, a witness is deposed concerning some
general aspect of the defendant's (D's) liability. The testimony proves
favorable to D. The issue: If that witness is unavailable to testify in
the subsequent trial of a different plaintiff (P2), may D introduce the
deposition testimony?
The operative federal rules-Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
32(a) 12 and Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(1)' 3-appear to say that
D may not use the testimony against P2 unless P2 or P2's predecessor in
interest had an opportunity to examine the witness. The rules appear,
at first glance, to make perfect sense. It seems unfair to allow D to
use the testimony against P2 if P2 was not present at the deposition and
had no opportunity to cross-examine. Allowing D to use the deposi-
tion against P2 seems a very different matter from allowing P2 to use it
against D, because D was present at the deposition. Nevertheless,
courts have struggled with this issue, and have divided on whether to
prohibit D from using the deposition testimony against P2 because P2
was absent when the testimony was given.' 4 Most courts have given
the rules a broad construction, allowing the use of a prior-action depo-
sition of an unavailable witness if there was a party to the prior action
with similar motive and opportunity to develop the testimony. 15
and other formal and informal coordination devices. Plaintiffs' counsel may have di-
vergent interests in the structured coordination MDL imposes. "Although some
plaintiffs' attorneys will welcome coordinated efforts to press discovery, others would
prefer to pursue their own strategy in their own forum without risk of loss of control
to what is supposed to be a representative Steering Committee." Sara D. Schotland,
Multidistrict Litigation Presents Litigators with Range of Strategy Choices, 6 Inside
Litig., Feb. 1992, at 22, 24.
12. Rule 32(a) allows deposition testimony to be used, in certain circumstances,
"against any party who was present or represented at the taking of the deposition or
who had reasonable notice thereof." The rule further provides:
[W]hen an action has been brought in any court of the United States or of
any State and another action involving the same subject matter is afterward
brought between the same parties or their representatives or successors in
interest, all depositions lawfully taken and duly filed in the former action
may be used in the latter as if originally taken therefor. A deposition previ-
ously taken may also be used as permitted by the Federal Rules of Evidence.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 32(a)(4).
13. For unavailable witnesses, Rule 804(b)(1) establishes a hearsay exception for:
Testimony given as a witness at another hearing of the same or a different
proceeding, or in a deposition taken in compliance with law in the course of
the same or another proceeding, if the party against whom the testimony is
now offered, or, in a civil action or proceeding, a predecessor in interest, had
an opportunity and similar motive to develop the testimony by direct, cross,
or redirect examination.
Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(1).
14. Compare, e.g., Ikerd v. Lapworth, 435 F.2d 197, 205 (7th Cir. 1970) (allowing
use of prior-action deposition) with Alamo v. Pueblo Int'l Inc., 58 F.R.D. 193, 194-95
(D.P.R. 1972) (prohibiting use of prior-action deposition).
15. See infra notes 124-27, 140-43 and accompanying text.
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Whether or not they supported D's use of the testimony, however,
courts and commentators considering the issue have uniformly as-
sumed a fundamental difference between D's use of the testimony
against P2 and P2's use of the testimony against D.'6 D was present at
the deposition; P2 was not. It is on this point that the realities of mod-
em mass tort litigation make a difference, and a difference that criti-
cally undermines the central argument against allowing D to use the
deposition testimony against P2.
What the courts and commentators have failed to recognize is that
in modem mass tort litigation, the plaintiffs' and defendants' lawyers
often share a roughly equivalent counsel structure. The defendants'
litigation control structure consists of primary defense counsel at the
hub and various local counsel at the spokes. The plaintiffs' litigation
control structure consists of individual plaintiffs' lawyers at the spokes
and a coordinating committee or information exchange vehicle at the
hub.
The nature of these litigation control structures in modern mass tort
litigation undermines the cherished assumption of litigation control
independence, the assumed separateness of individual lawsuits.
Moreover, the rough equivalence of plaintiffs' and defendants' litiga-
tion control structures suggests the fallacy of clinging to litigation in-
dependence as a proper dichotomy between D's use against P2 and
P2's use against D. For both of these reasons, a realistic appraisal of
modem mass tort litigation undermines the foremost criticism-what
we shall call the fairness critique-of the broad interpretation many
courts have given to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 32(a) and Fed-
eral Rule of Evidence 804(b)(1).
This Article examines the litigation control structures commonly
employed in modem mass tort litigation, and finds that developments
in both the plaintiffs' bar and the defense bar have resulted in vastly
increased interdependence and coordination among counsel. It then
turns to the implications of this collectivist trend on procedural deci-
sion-making, using as an example the issue of whether deposition tes-
timony may be used in subsequent actions involving different parties.
In particular, it looks at the broad construction given by a number of
courts to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 32(a) and Federal Rule of
Evidence 804(b)(1), allowing the use of deposition testimony against
certain non-parties to the prior actions. This Article assesses the fair-
16. See J. Randall Coffey, Note, Admissibility of Prior-Action Depositions and
Former Testimony Under Fed K? Civ. P. 32(a)(4) and Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(1): Courts
Differing Interpretations, 41 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 155, 178-79 (1984) (stating that
courts nearly always allow P2 to use deposition or other former testimony against D
where the issues are substantially the same, but the issue is more difficult where the
deposition or testimony is sought to be used against a non-party to the prior action).
Likewise, courts easily allow a later defendant (D 2) to use a deposition or other for-
mer testimony against a plaintiff (P1) who was a party to the prior action. Id. In mass
tort litigation, the P2 v. D1 posture arises more often than the P v. D2 posture.
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ness critique, the dominant criticism of the courts' broad formulation,
in light of the realities of modem mass tort litigation. It concludes
that the courts' broad formulation works well and proposes a clearer
codification of that formulation. The issue of prior-action depositions
in mass tort litigation illustrates the importance of paying attention to
major shifts in the way law is practiced, in this case, a shift toward
interdependence among counsel. The collectivism inherent in modern
mass tort practice carries implications as well for non-party issue pre-
clusion and for the utility of non-transsubstantive rules 7 of civil
procedure.
I. MODERN MASS TORT LITIGATION
A. Nature of the Beast
"Mass tort" refers to conduct of one or more tortfeasors that causes
widespread injury, where the individual tort claims share some com-
mon factual basis.'8 Most mass tort litigation can be classified either
as mass disaster litigation, which involves injuries suffered by many at
one time and place, or mass products liability litigation, which in-
volves wide distribution of a defective product.'9 The former includes
plane, train and bus crashes, building collapses, hotel fires, explosions,
chemical spills, gas leaks, and nuclear reactor accidents. The latter
includes claims by consumers, workers and others for product-caused
injuries.
It has been observed that the proliferation of mass tort litigation
"reflects the increasingly collective nature of life in the second half of
the twentieth century."20 What is "mass" in mass tort litigation fol-
lows naturally, if not inevitably, from mass transportation in planes
and trains that may crash, mass production and mass distribution of
products that may injure, and mass media that alert would-be plain-
tiffs to their potential claims.2'
Mass tort litigation is characterized by extraordinary commonality
of evidence relating to the defendant's liability from one plaintiff's
17. "Transsubstantive" rules are rules that apply across all substantive areas of
law, as opposed to "specialized" or "non-transsubstantive" rules, which apply only to
specifically defined areas of law. The current Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are
transsubstantive. See sources cited infra note 195.
18. See Trangsrud, Joinder Alternatives, supra note 4, at 780. The once-popular
term "mass accident," used in Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) advisory committee's note
(1966), works well for plane and train crashes, but inaptly describes most toxic torts
and mass products liability litigations. See Resnik, supra note 1, at 9.
19. See Trangsrud, Joinder Alternatives, supra note 4, at 780-81 & nn. 2-6.
20. Mark A. Peterson & Molly Selvin, Mass Justice: The Limited and Unlimited
Power of Courts, 54 Law & Contemp. Probs. 227, 227 (1991).
21. As to the mass media's impact, Peterson and Selvin observe that mass litiga-
tion involving Bendectin, an anti-nausea drug that allegedly caused birth defects, was
precipitated by a 1979 National Enquirer article. Id. at 227 n.1 (citing New
Thalidomide-Type Scandal-Experts Reveal... Common Drug Causing Deformed
Babies, Nat'l Enquirer, Oct. 9, 1979, at 20).
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case to the next. That, after all, is what makes it mass litigation rather
than simply a bunch of cases. In the asbestos litigation, for example,
evidence concerning the industry's scientific knowledge-and there-
fore its duty to warn of known hazards and its inability to rely on a
state-of-the-art defense-figures prominently in essentially every
case. The deposition of Dr. Kenneth Wallace Smith provides a prime
example. Dr. Smith, the former medical director of Johns-Manville
Corporation, was deposed January 18, 1976, in the Pennsylvania case
of DeRocco v. Forty-Eight Insulation, Inc.' For much of his twenty-
four year career at the world's largest asbestos manufacturer, Dr.
Smith was the organization's only full-time physician. His deposition,
taken when Dr. Smith was sixty-three years old, thus provides the tes-
timony of a witness uniquely able to discuss the extent of knowledge
available to the asbestos industry in the 1940s and 1950s concerning
the product's hazards.' After Dr. Smith's death, his testimony, which
was favorable to plaintiffs, remained powerfully relevant. Plaintiffs
frequently sought to use the deposition in later cases.74
Even more than in toxic tort cases such as the asbestos litigation,
mass disaster litigation involves heavily overlapping factual issues.
Evidence concerning an airplane crash or building collapse varies lit-
tle, at least as to liability, from one plaintiff's case to another's. 5
This commonality of evidence from case to case partly explains why
courts, lawyers, litigants, and the public perceive a mass tort litigation
as an interrelated whole. That perception may owe even more, how-
ever, to the commonality of interest among same-side litigants.26 With
commonality of interest as the carrot, and the sheer magnitude and
22. No. 7880 (Pa. Ct. C.P. 1974), cited in Dykes v. Raymark Indus., 801 F.2d 810,
815 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1038 (1987); Murphy v. Owens-Illinois, Inc.,
779 F.2d 340, 343 (6th Cir. 1985); Clay v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 722 F.2d 1289,
1294 (6th Cir. 1983), cerL denied, 467 U.S. 1253 (1984).
23. See Dykes, 801 F.2d at 815-16; Murphy, 779 F.2d at 343; Clay, 722 F.2d at 1294.
24. See Dykes, 801 F.2d at 815-16; Murphy, 779 F.2d at 343; Dartez v. Fibreboard
Corp., 765 F.2d 456 (5th Cir. 1985); Clay, 722 F.2d at 1294; In re Johns-Manville As-
bestosis Cases, 93 F.R.D. 853, 854 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
For similar reasons, the 1975 deposition of Richard Gaze continues to excite asbes-
tos litigants. Gaze was a scientist for Cape Industries, a South African company that
mined raw asbestos. He had worked for Cape Industries since 1940, and testified at
his deposition about the state of scientific knowledge in the asbestos industry. Like
the Smith deposition, the Gaze deposition has continued to cause courts evidentiary
headaches following Gaze's death, as plaintiffs seek to use the deposition to establish
the industry's state of scientific knowledge. Compare King v. Armstrong World In-
dus., 906 F.2d 1022, 1025-26 (5th Cir. 1990) (allowing use of Gaze deposition), cert.
denied, 500 U.S. 942 (1991) with Lohrmann v. Pittsburgh Coming Corp., 782 F.2d
1156, 1160-61 (4th Cir. 1986) (prohibiting use of Gaze deposition).
25. See Ralph K. Winter, Comment Aggregating Litigation, 54 Law & Contemp.
Probs. 69, 70-71 (1991).
26. Professor Judith Resnik has commented on the shift in focus from litigants'
"rights" to "interests," and the concomitant movement "as cases themselves lose their
boundaries and become part of a 'litigation.'" Resnik, supra note 1, at 50. As she
noted:
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dispersion of mass litigation as the stick, litigation control structures
on each side of the modem mass tort litigation have evolved into com-
plex coordinated networks of attorneys.
B. Litigation Control Structures
1. Defense Counsel
A defendant faced with the prospect of substantial mass tort liabil-
ity or litigation invariably hires outside counsel to handle the de-
fense.27 In the increasingly common situation where such litigation is
multi-jurisdictional, however, that outside counsel typically cannot
handle the entire defense on its own.28 Counsel defending against
multi-jurisdictional mass tort litigation, therefore, generally hires local
counsel in each jurisdiction where a complaint has been or is likely to
be filed.29
Hiring local counsel is one of lead counsel's first and most impor-
tant tasks.3 0 Local counsel are lead counsel's eyes and ears-and
mouths-in every court where the lead counsel are not admitted to
practice. For local counsel to discharge this function effectively, lead
counsel must establish mechanisms to keep local counsel abreast of
developments in the litigation and for local counsel to inform lead
counsel of suit-specific happenings. Techniques employed include pe-
riodic seminars, regular mailings and, with increasing frequency, inter-
firm electronic mail.
The complexity of the defense counsel network, not surprisingly,
multiplies with multiple defendants. Multiple defendants retain multi-
ple lawyers, and those lawyers may coordinate either informally or
formally through indemnification and defense agreements.3 1 Rela-
By phrases such as the "asbestos litigation" and the "Savings and Loan liti-
gation," we link individuals and their interests with the image that courts and
lawyers could and should interact with such a "litigation" as an interrelated
whole. The primacy of the individual in relation to her or his own case has
declined.
Id. at 51-52.
27. See John Gerald Gleeson, Planning the Defense of the Mass Toxic Tort Case,
For the Defense, June 1993, at 13, 15.
28. This inability is not generally a function of lead counsel's inadequate size. In-
deed, lead defense counsel in mass tort litigation are frequently from among the coun-
try's largest firms. Rather, the need derives from local rules requiring local counsel's
involvement, from local counsel's greater familiarity with practice and judges in dis-
persed fora, as well as from cost considerations.
29. See Patricia L. Glaser, Case Management and Depositions in Complex Litiga-
tion, in Management of Complex Mass Tort Litigation: Preparing for Trial, at 301,
305 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No. 306, 1986).
30. Id.
31. See Edward Lowenberg, Consolidated Defense Experience: Working with Co-
Defendants to Really Minimize Costs, in Litigation Management Supercourse, at 489,
491-94 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No. H4-5184, 1993);
Albert H. Parnell, The Coordinated Group Defense, For the Defense, Nov. 1980, at
16. The Defense Research Institute (DRI), a rough counterpart of the plaintiff-ori-
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tionships within the defense network may become quite intricate. If a
lead defendant offers to indemnify codefendants and undertake a
common defense, some codefendants may decline the offer, creating a
sharp division between aligned defendants and nonaligned defend-
ants. Even where coordination is informal, alliances and divisions of
interests and ideas form rapidly and shift often.
Group effort may be more difficult among defendants than among
plaintiffs32 because defendants often seek to avoid or minimize liabil-
ity by allotting blame to their codefendants.33 In mass tort litigation
where one party, such as the manufacturer of an allegedly defective
product, appears to be the plaintiffs' primary target, an indemnity
agreement may remove this conflict and enable the codefendants to
present a united defense.
Even where defendants seek to minimize their exposure in the allo-
cation of liability among joint tortfeasors, they normally can unite on
certain issues. In particular, non-merit defenses such as the statute of
limitations, and procedural options such as venue transfer, forum non
conveniens and removal, 34 often find defendants of one mind.35 In the
mass tort litigation involving exposure to the agricultural chemical
dibromochloropropane (DBCP), various defendant chemical manu-
facturers and fruit growers jointly sought removal from Florida state
ented Association of Trial Lawyers of America (ATLA), provides seminars and re-
search for defense lawyers. David Ranii, For the Other Side, Nat'l L.J., Sept. 13, 1982,
at 1, 10. Mr. Parnell wrote in 1980 that "[c]oordinated group defense is in its infancy."
Parnell, supra, at 24. In 1982, a DRI leader described the Institute as being in "late
adolescence." Ranii, supra, at 10. Whether or not defense lawyers will agree that
coordination has reached adulthood, they can no longer view it as embryonic. The
DRI has formed litigation groups for defense counsel involved in certain types of
product liability litigation, and offers other services to the defense bar such as an
expert witness index and a brief bank. See Kathryn Dix Sowle, Toward a Synthesis of
Product Liability Principles: Schwartz's Model and the Cost-Minimization Alternative,
46 U. Miami L. Rev. 1, 38 n.174 (1991).
32. For a discussion of coordination among plaintiffs' counsel in mass tort cases,
see infra part I.B.2.
33. A defendant whose individual interests diverge from those of the group as a
whole may find itself bound or burdened by decisions of the group. This has been
called the problem of the "kidnapped rider," and is in a way the flip side of the better
known "free rider" problem. See Yeazell, supra note 3, at 44.
34. In the case of removal to federal court, coordination among defendants may
not only be possible, but required. Courts have held the removal procedure statute,
28 U.S.C. § 1446, to require unanimity among defendants. That is, unless all served
non-nominal defendants join in the petition for removal within 30 days after the first
defendant is served, the removal is defective. See, eg., Johnson v. Helmerich &
Payne, Inc., 892 F.2d 422, 423 (5th Cir. 1990).
35. One defense lawyer has advocated the use of formal, written agreements
among mass tort defendants to cooperate, and even to be represented by a single
defense counsel. While defendants have a strong interest in presenting a unified
front, informal "understandings" of cooperation can break down because of defend-
ants' urge to point the finger at each other. Peter N. Sheridan, Sharing Agreements:
One Method of Managing Mass Tort Litigation, in Management of Mass Tort Litiga-
tion, at 89, 91 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No. 231, 1983).
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court to federal court,36 and asserted motions for dismissal under the
doctrine of forum non conveniens.37 Defense counsel in the asbestos
litigation similarly have cooperated by coordinating discovery efforts38
and by sharing information.39 One mass tort defense lawyer has noted
the development of "[m]ore effective and economical use of multi-
defense counsel by organization within the group, by periodic meet-
ings, delegation of particular tasks to specific attorneys, formation of
deposition and trial teams, widespread and effective use of paralegals,
and the use of one attorney or firm to represent, where appropriate,
more than one defendant."40
2. Plaintiffs' Counsel
In recent years, plaintiffs' lawyers in mass tort litigation increasingly
have availed themselves of the advantages of coordination."1 Popular
mechanisms include newsletters, shared discovery, prepared trial
packets, seminars on pending litigation, joint strategic planning, coor-
dinated identification and preparation of expert witnesses, centrally
handled scientific research and jury focus groups, and "schools" to ed-
36. See Cabalceta v. Standard Fruit Co., 883 F.2d 1553, 1555 (11th Cir. 1989);
Sibaja v. Dow Chem. Co., 757 F.2d 1215, 1216 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 948
(1985); Rojas v. DeMent, 137 F.R.D. 30, 31 (S.D. Fla. 1991).
37. See Cabalceta, 883 F.2d at 1555-56; Sibaja, 757 F.2d at 1216; Rojas, 137 F.R.D.
at 31-32. In a more recent round of DBCP litigation in Texas, a number of defendants
likewise supported removal to federal court and moved for forum non conveniens
dismissal. See Brief of Defendants in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion to Remand at
1, Delgado v. Shell Oil Co., No. H-94-1337 (S.D. Tex. 1994); Defendant's Memoran-
dum of Law in Support of Motion to Dismiss on Grounds of Forum Non Conveniens
at 1-2, Delgado v. Shell Oil Co., No. G-94-193 (S.D. Tex. 1994).
38. See Gold v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 723 F.2d 1068, 1075 (3d Cir. 1983).
This is an example of defense coordination gone awry. Defendant Johns-Manville
Sales Corp., pursuant to the defendants' informal arrangement, was to gather eviden-
tiary material for use at trial by all of the defendants. When Johns-Manville filed a
bankruptcy petition shortly before trial, the other defendants were left with inade-
quate discovery. Id. at 1075. The court refused to postpone the trial. Id. at 1075-76.
See also Bromberg & Slowinski, supra note 4, at 386 (noting that the Gold case and
similar instances may discourage coordination among defendants).
39. See Myra Alperson, Asbestos Defendants Begin to Cooperate in Litigation,
Legal Times, Sept. 19, 1983, at 3.
Information sharing is made easier by the capabilities of modern litigation com-
puter databases. Peterson & Co., a consultant to the Center for Claims Resolution, a
group of 21 asbestos defendants, maintains a database tracking 100,000 claims and
over one million documents. Jo McIntyre, Handling the Monster Case, Law Office
Computing, June-July 1992, at 33, 34.
40. O.J. Weber, Mass Tort Litigation: The Pot Boils Over, 6 J. Prod. Liab. 273,280
(1983).
41. More obvious but to similar effect, a single lawyer or firm may represent a
number of plaintiff-clients. "While in theory and in form each case is separate, in
practice lawyers on both sides deal with the cases as a group, sometimes making
'block settlements'-in which defendants give a lawyer representing a group of plain-
tiffs money that is then allocated among a set of clients." Resnik, supra note 1, at 38.
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ucate individual lawyers about their tort and how to try the case.4 2
Multiple plaintiffs with separate counsel may be connected by an affil-
iate relationship with a single prominent plaintiffs' firm. For example,
one South Carolina firm, which has represented more asbestos plain-
tiffs in the past twenty years than any other firm, shares responsibility
and fees for thousands of cases brought by "affiliated counsel" around
the country.43
Coordination may arise from formal, external forces such as the ju-
dicial aggregation of cases by class action, multidistrict litigation or
consolidation." In such cases the court may (and usually does) im-
pose a structure and set ground rules for a "steering committee," and
decisions of the committee bind all of the aggregated claims.4" In ad-
dition to a steering committee or lead counsel, the court may require
the appointment of "liaison counsel" to serve as a link among the
steering committee, the individual plaintiffs' lawyers, and the court.
46
Alternatively, coordination may and frequently does arise informally
through voluntary cooperation among counsel.47 The position of lead
counsel or committee member is coveted both for the challenges and
42. See David Ranii, How the Plaintiffs' Bar Shares Its Information, Nat'l L., July
23, 1984, at 1, 9 [hereinafter Ranii, Plaintiffs' Bar]; Resnik, supra note 1, at 38-39; Paul
D. Rheingold, The Development of Litigation Groups, 6 Am. J. Trial Advoc. 1, 5
(1982) [hereinafter Rheingold, Litigation Groups]. Professor Roger Trangsrud sug-
gested in 1985 that at least as to discovery, it is rare for mass tort lawyers to coordi-
nate informally. Trangsrud, Joinder Alternatives, supra note 4, at 811. Based upon the
authors' experience, that view is, at best, outdated.
43. Roger Parloff, The Tort that Ate the Constitution, Am. Law., July-Aug. 1994, at
75,77. Under its arrangement, the firm handles liability issues and national discovery,
and the local firms handle issues of individual exposure and damages, as well as day-
to-day case administration. See Sowle, supra note 30, at 39 n.175 (citing Karen Dillon,
Only $1.5 Million a Year, Am. Law., Oct. 1989, at 38, 38-40).
44. Rheingold, Litigation Groups, supra note 42, at 1-2.
45. Id. at 3-5; M.C.L.2d, supra note 10, § 20.22.
46. M.C.L.2d, supra note 10, § 20.221. The first tentative draft of the Manual for
Complex Litigation (Third), like its predecessor, discusses coordination among coun-
sel and defines useful roles for lead counsel, liaison counsel and counsel committees.
Because the Manual is geared toward giving judges tools to manage complex litiga-
tion, it focuses almost entirely on coordination imposed by the court, urging judges to
institute procedures for coordination and to designate lead counsel or committees by
court order, and largely ignores the enormous amount of coordination that occurs
voluntarily among counsel in the absence of any judicial intervention. See Manual for
Complex Litigation (Third) § 20.22 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1994) [hereinafter
M.C.L.3d (Tentative Draft)]. In the specific context of mass tort litigation, however,
the draft mentions that cooperative information-sharing among plaintiffs' counsel is
increasingly common. Id. § 33.22 n.1346.
47. Rheingold, Litigation Groups, supra note 42, at 2. See Ranii, Plaintiffs' Bar,
supra note 42, at 1. Ranii comments:
Although some "litigation groups" are formed at the behest of courts in mul-
tidistrict litigation or in class actions, personal-injury lawyers have found it
mutually advantageous to join forces voluntarily in many other cases involv-
ing the same product and common foes, sometimes doing so with the aid of
the Association of Trial Lawyers of America.
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power it brings and, as in securities class actions,48 for the additional
fees it often generates.49 After an initial power struggle, 50 control
generally falls to a small cadre of lawyers.
At the center of the movement toward voluntary coordination is the
Association of Trial Lawyers of America ("ATLA"), and the "litiga-
tion groups" it sponsors. According to ATLA, the purpose of a litiga-
tion group is to permit plaintiffs
to benefit from the collected experience, materials, and information
in the possession of the plaintiffs' attorneys litigating similar cases,
while reducing the high costs of litigation. The litigation group pro-
vides a collegial networking structure whereby members exchange
information, share experiences, and develop discovery and litigation
strategies in the spirit of professional cooperation toward mutually
held goals. 51
ATLA litigation groups exist for everything from Accutane to Yugos;
among them are a Dalkon Shield Litigation Group, a Construction
Site Accidents Litigation Group, and a Breast Implants Litigation
Group.52 There is even a Delivery Service Negligence Group, de-
48. See Evan A. Davis & Mitchell A. Lowenthal, Class Actions, in 4 Securities
Law Techniques § 92.10 (A.A. Sommer, Jr. ed., forthcoming 1995).
49. Evidencing the desirability of lead counsel positions, the draft Manual for
Complex Litigation (Third) lists demotion or removal from lead counsel as a possible
sanction for misconduct. M.C.L.3d (Tentative Draft), supra note 46, § 20.153.
50. See, e.g., Daniel Wise, Lawyers Pack World Trade Center Hearing, N.Y. L.J.,
May 9, 1994, at 1. One lawyer has described organizational meetings for plaintiffs'
groups as "splendid displays of ego and peacock tail spreading." Rheingold, Litiga-
tion Groups, supra note 42, at 3.
51. ATLA Guide to Litigation Groups, Trial, July 1991, at S1, S2.
52. Id. at S3-S24. The Breast Implants Litigation Group, for example, strives "to
permit each victim of breast implant injuries to benefit from the collected experience,
discovery tactics, and litigation strategies of plaintiffs' attorneys who have handled or
are handling similar cases." Breast Implants Litigation Group, in J. Douglas Peters &
Margaret M. Aulino, Breast Implants: Science & Litigation, Trial, Nov. 1991, at 26, 31.
Writing about the massive litigation arising out of the ingestion of the amino acid L-
tryptophan, one plaintiffs' lawyer noted that in that litigation, "plaintiffs' lawyers are
organized and well informed, which leads to another 21st century feature of the L-T
mass disaster litigation: the ATLA L-T Litigation Group." Gayle L. Troutwine, Ge-
netic Engineering of L-tryptophan: Futuristic Disaster, Trial, July 1991, at 20, 25.
The current list of ATLA litigation groups and subgroups includes, among others:
Accutane, Airbags, All-Terrain Vehicles, Automatic Doors, Back-Up Alarms, Battery
Explosions, BIC Lighters, Birth Defects, Teratogens and Bendectin, Brakes, Breast
Implants, Child Restraints, Chymopapain, Construction Site Accidents, Crane Injury,
Dalkon Shield, Defective Firearms, Defibrillators, Delivery Service Negligence, DES,
Diet Products, Dioxin and PCP, Dry-Cleaning Fluid Exposure, Electromagnetic Ra-
diation, Ethylene Oxide, Fire Loss, Formaldehyde, Fuel System Integrity, Halcion,
Hard Metals Disease, Hazardous Materials, Heart Valves (Bjork-Shiley), Helmets,
HMR 500, Industrial and Agricultural Products and Vehicles, Interstate Trucking, Iso-
cyanates, Kerosene Heaters, Lead Paint, Legionnaires' Disease, L.P. Gas Explosions,
L-Tryptophan, Mining and Oil Field Products and Accidents, Motorcycles, Multi-
Piece Wheels/Rims, Non-Steroidal Anti-Inflammatory Drugs, Pesticides, Pleasure
Boats/Personal Watercraft, Prozac, Roof Crush, School Buses, Seat Belts, Seat De-
sign, Sudden Acceleration, Tardive Dyskinesia, Theophylline, Tire/Rim Mismatch,
[Vol. 631000
MASS TORT LITIGATION
voted primarily to suing Domino's Pizza for automobile accidents re-
sulting from too-speedy pizza deliveries.53 In addition to the litigation
groups, ATLA provides the plaintiffs' bar access to an on-line
database of thousands of current tort topics. 54
Within the plaintiffs' network, the attorneys claim a "common inter-
est privilege" to protect confidential communications among the vari-
ous plaintiffs' counsel in a mass tort litigation.51 In order to speak
freely about strategy and other confidential matters, organizers some-
times go to extraordinary lengths to protect their meetings from infil-
tration by defendants or other unwanted interlopers.56
The first significant plaintiffs' group was formed in 1963 by a group
of thirty-three lawyers pursuing claims in numerous state and federal
courts against Richardson-Merrell, the manufacturer of MER/29, an
anti-cholesterol drug linked to cataracts.5 The group supplied its
members with materials, including a newsletter, copies of documents
from Richardson-Merrell's files for use in proving liability, a medical
analysis of cataracts, and transcripts of previous trials.58 It sponsored
the "MER/29 School," which taught attorneys how to conduct trials
against Richardson-Merrell.59 Perhaps most importantly, the group
Toys and Recreational Equipment, Transmissions, Urocanic Acid, Vaccines, Vehicle
Rollovers, Vehicle Underride, Vending Machine Tip-Overs, and Versed. ATLA
Guide to Litigation Groups 1 (1993).
53. ATLA Guide to Litigation Groups, supra note 51, at S10.
54. Kenneth R. Betzler, Plaintiffs' Counsel, in Effective Coordination of Multiple
Product Liability Litigation, at 49, 51 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Hand-
book Series No. H4-5040, 1988). ATLA also offers an expert witness database, a
planned deposition bank, and a brief-writing service. Sowle, supra note 31, at 39-40.
The ATLA Exchange, a repository of information on cases handled by members, in-
cludes data on, among other things, more than 4000 products. Id. at 39 & n.176.
55. The same is true of defense counsel. The MDL judge in the L-tryptophan
litigation achieved this by order.
The Court recognizes that cooperation and coordination by and among
plaintiffs' counsel and by and among defendants' counsel are essential for
the orderly and expeditious resolution of this litigation. The communication
of information among and between plaintiffs' counsel and among and be-
tween defendants' counsel shall not be deemed a waiver of the attorney-
client privilege or the protection afforded attorneys' work product ....
In re L-tryptophan Litigation, MDL No. 865, Order No. 1, at 9-10 (D.S.C. Feb. 25,
1991).
56. See Rheingold, Litigation Groups, supra note 42, at 4-5. For example, in the
"school" sponsored to train swine flu vaccine plaintiffs' lawyers, forms on odd-colored
paper were mailed to known members of the plaintiffs' litigation group. Tickets on a
different odd-colored paper were sent to lawyers who registered by returning the
form. A police officer controlled the ticket-only admission. Id. at 5. "In addition, the
location of strategy meetings sometimes is kept 'so secretive that the people who are
supposed to be there don't know where it is going to be' until the last minute." Ranii,
Plaintiffs' Bar, supra note 42, at 11 (quoting plaintiffs' lawyer Jonathan T. Zackey).
57. Ranii, Plaintiffs' Bar, supra note 42, at 9; Paul D. Rheingold, The MER/29
Story-An Instance of Successful Mass Disaster Litigation, 56 Cal. L. Rev. 116, 122
(1968) [hereinafter Rheingold, The MER129 Story].
58. Rheingold, The MER129 Story, supra note 57, at 122-24.
59. Id. at 131.
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reached a voluntary agreement with the defendant that all discovery
carried out by the group's representatives was applicable to all cases
in the MER/29 group, including cases that joined the group after the
completion of the discovery. 60 This arrangement lowered discovery
costs to both the defendant and the plaintiffs. Over 100,000 docu-
ments were made available to the group's trustee, who copied perti-
nent documents. 61 Additionally, the group submitted a standard set
of interrogatories to which the defendant provided uniform answers. 62
Ultimately, the MER/29 group members had greater success in ob-
taining settlements from the drug manufacturer than did those who
declined to join the group.63
The development of plaintiffs' groups continued in the 1970s with
the Dalkon Shield group. Many of the Dalkon Shield group's mem-
bers, all of whom represented plaintiffs claiming injury from the
Dalkon Shield intrauterine contraceptive device, had been involved
earlier with the MER/29 group.6' One member of the Dalkon Shield
group offered a succinct explanation of the value of coordination:
"[E]arly on I got a box of what I call smoking-pistol papers that would
have been very difficult, if not impossible, to get hold of on my
own." 65 In the decades since, plaintiffs' groups and other forms of
coordination in mass tort litigation have grown from the exception to
the rule.
A measure of the power that well-organized plaintiffs' groups have
attained is the response they engender in defendants. One mass tort
defendant recently felt compelled to strike back at the organized
plaintiffs' bar by filing a lawsuit against plaintiffs' counsel, alleging,
among other things, RICO and antitrust violations.66 The defendant,
an asbestos manufacturer, alleged that ATLA's Asbestos Litigation
Group "refers to itself as 'The Allied Forces,' and is united in its ef-
forts to control access to the courts for asbestos claimants, monopolize
the market for asbestos claimants, and monopolize the market for as-
bestos settlement and verdict dollars. 67
A primary activity of plaintiffs' groups is sharing information.68 In-
formation may be conveyed by word of mouth, newsletter or, usually
60. Id. at 127.
61. Id. at 129-30.
62. Id. at 130.
63. Id. at 138. MER/29 has been called "one of the great success stories of volun-
tary cooperation among litigants." Complex Litigation Project, supra note 4, at 12.
64. Paul D. Rheingold, Mass Disaster Litigation and the Use of Plaintiffs' Groups,
3 Litig., Spring 1977, at 18, 18 [hereinafter Rheingold, Mass Disaster Litigation].
65. Ranii, Plaintiffs' Bar, supra note 42, at 9.
66. Keene Corp. v. Williams Bailey & Wesner, L.L.P., Asbestos Litig. Rep. (An-
drews Pubs.) 30082, 30110, 30112 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. June 3, 1994).
67. Id. at 30095.
68. One plaintiffs' lawyer involved in mass tort litigation extolled the benefits of
information sharing: "Most important, we have not spent hours reinventing the
wheel; instead, we have been able to rely on the shared research and discovery of
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at a price, by a pre-packaged "trial packet" that provides an instruc-
tion manual to lawyers bringing a certain type of case, often with a
collection of material documents (organized, sometimes, on trial-
ready CD-ROM). The swine flu plaintiffs' steering committee created
a five-volume trial handbook.69 Steering committees may negotiate
extensive protocols covering the documents' authenticity and admissi-
bility,7 making their packages even more user-friendly.
Defendants have vigorously fought information sharing, often argu-
ing that privilege or trade secrets require that discovery remain confi-
dential.71 Unless the plaintiff's attorney conducts discovery with the
purpose of using the information in a later case,72 however, courts
generally view evidence sharing as consistent with the efficient admin-
istration of justice.73
In addition to sharing evidence, litigation groups support individual
lawyers in several ways. Some, such as the MER/29 group, have held
"schools" to educate individual plaintiffs' lawyers on how to try their
cases.74 Some litigation groups have appeared as amici curiae on legal
issues common to their mass tort.7" ATLA's L-tryptophan group
researched jurisdictional issues, located a laboratory equipped to ana-
lyze L-tryptophan pills, retained a research organization to explore
fellow group members." Troutwine, supra note 52, at 25; see also Richard L Marcus,
Apocalypse Now?, 85 Mich. L. Rev. 1267, 1288 (1987) (stating that "[ilnformation
sharing among plaintiffs' lawyers has become a widespread feature of the contempo-
rary litigation landscape").
69. Rheingold, Litigation Groups, supra note 42, at 8.
70. See, e.g., In re L-tryptophan Litigation, MDL No. 865, Order No. 29 at 1
(D.S.C. Feb. 24, 1994) (approving stipulation as to foundation for certain documents,
including authenticity and applicability of business records hearsay exception).
71. See Jonathan Kirsch, Evidence-Sharing, Cal. Law., June 1985, at 19, 22; Gary
L. Wilson, Note, Seattle Tunes: What Effect on Discovery Sharing?, 1985 Wis. L Rev.
1055, 1059; see also, Rich Arthurs, Defendants Fight Back on Data-Sharing, Legal
Times, July 16, 1984, at 1 (describing Ford Motor Company's attempt to use trade
secret protection to prevent plaintiffs' attorneys from sharing crash test data).
72. See Johnson Foils, Inc. v. Huyck Corp., 61 F.RD. 405, 410 (N.D.N.Y. 1973);
see also Damon Darlin, Lawyers Who Won Verdicts in Rely Trials Are Selling Their
Evidence, Angering P&G, Wall St. J., Dec. 20,1982, at 19 (concerning sale of informa-
tion for profit by plaintiffs' attorneys); David Ranii, Lawyer Cited in Document Sale,
Nat'l LJ., July 18, 1983, at 10 (same).
73. See, e.g., Ward v. Ford Motor Co., 93 F.R.D. 579, 580 (D. Colo. 1982) (noting
with regard to an ATLA litigation group that "[e]fficient administration of justice
requires that courts encourage, not hamstring, information exchanges such as that
here involved"); see also Kirsch, supra note 71, at 22, 86 (commenting from plaintiffs'
perspective on efficiency of evidence sharing and arguing that it violates no legal or
ethical duties); Wilson, supra note 71, at 1060-64 (noting that courts generally ap-
prove discovery sharing).
74. Complex Litigation Project, supra note 4, at 12; Rheingold, The MER129
Story, supra note 57, at 131. Similar schools have been held in the Dalkon Shield and
swine flu litigations. Rheingold, Litigation Groups, supra note 42, at 8.
75. Rheingold, Litigation Groups, supra note 42, at 7.
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medical and scientific aspects of the claims,7 6 and conducted focus
group jury studies.77 In the breast implant litigation, plaintiffs' coun-
sel devised a "Master Complaint," filed in the Multi-District Litiga-
tion, and a "Complaint and Adoption by Reference," to be filed by
individual plaintiffs in whichever federal district court they chose.78
The individual plaintiff's counsel fills in blanks with information such
as the plaintiff's name and dates of implantation surgery, checks off
entities from a list of thirty-five potential defendants, and "adopts by
reference" claims from a list of twenty-eight potential causes of action
asserted in the Master Complaint.79
There is something inexorable about plaintiffs' coordination in mass
tort litigation. It bubbles up from attorneys for the collective strength
it brings. It filters down from judges for the coherence it imposes.
And bench and bar alike are drawn to its efficiency.80 Perhaps it
is simply a manifestation of Americans' long-observed urge to
associate.8'
Perhaps, too, organization of plaintiffs' groups is driven by the same
forces that drive the formation of large law firms, among them, spe-
cialization and economies of scale. Plaintiffs' personal injury lawyers
76. See ATLA's L-tryptophan Group Provides Model for National Litigation Ef-
forts, ATLA Advoc., Mar. 1993, at 11.
77. Bill Trine, Remarks From Your Chair, Newsl. of the ATLA L-tryptophan Litig.
Group, Oct. 1993, at 2 (on file with the authors).
78. Aaron M. Levine, Fundamental Issues in Litigating Breast Implant Cases, in
Litigating Breast Implant Cases, at 15, 53-86 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course
Handbook Series No. H-451, 1992). Mr. Levine is a member of both the Plaintiffs'
National Steering Committee and the Plaintiffs' Lead Counsel Committee in the
breast implant litigation. Id. at 42-43.
79. Id. at 81-86.
80. While efficiency is part of coordination's allure to plaintiffs' attorneys, it mat-
ters little to plaintiffs themselves, most of whom pay counsel by contingent fee. It is
the attorney who has the economic incentive to seek efficiency in group effort. In
contrast, because defendants generally pay counsel hourly fees, it is the defendants
themselves, rather than their lawyers, who have the economic incentive to favor
efficiency.
On the interest of judges in aggregating mass litigation to minimize unnecessary
drudgery, and on the possibility that litigants and lawyers may sometimes prefer delay
and inefficiency, see Peterson & Selvin, supra note 19, at 230-33; see also Lea
Brilmayer, Comment on Peterson and Selvin, 54 Law & Contemp. Probs. 249 passim
(1991) (raising questions about judges' interests in whether cases are aggregated).
81. The observation belongs to de Tocqueville:
Americans of all ages, all conditions, and all dispositions, constantly form
associations. They have not only commercial and manufacturing companies,
in which all take part, but associations of a thousand other kinds .... Wher-
ever, at the head of some new undertaking, you see the government in
France, or a man of rank in England, in the United States you will be sure to
find an association.
2 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America 128-29 (Bowen ed. 1862). Indeed, as
Professor Yeazell points out, one form of collective litigation in the United States is
that pursued by voluntary organizations such as the National Association of Manufac-
turers, the National Council of Churches, the American Mining Congress and labor
unions. Yeazell, supra note 3, at 62.
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often feel quite comfortable handling the damages phase of a mass
tort case-proving the extent of injury to their own clients. The liabil-
ity phase, however, may involve complex science, language barriers,
and hundreds of thousands of documents. An individual case may not
warrant the time to develop a sophisticated position on complex liabil-
ity issues. An individual lawyer may in any event lack the requisite
expertise. Organization allows the pooling of resources and the as-
signment of responsibilities to those best equipped to handle them.s
One leading plaintiffs' lawyer commented over a decade ago on the
gravitation toward coordination:
Whereas in the first two decades of groups there were perhaps only
six that ran well and made achievements, it is easy to predict that
there will be many more in the near future. The courts are consoli-
dating litigation to diminish their own burdens and thereby bringing
plaintiff's groups into existence, willingly or otherwise. Manufac-
turers are putting out more bad products that cause widespread in-
jury; the high costs of handling a product case and the increased
expertise needed to develop one properly drive plaintiff's lawyers
together. No longer can each lawyer afford the time and money to
become an expert in one case.83
Recent developments have confirmed his prediction.
Consider, for example, the Twin Towers bombing litigation. The
lawsuits began immediately after the 1993 terrorist bombing of the
World Trade Center. Over the course of a year, 126 personal injury
suits were filed, raising 294 claims; 17 property damage suits were
filed, raising 159 claims, mostly for cars damaged in the bomb-col-
lapsed garage; and 31 business interruption suits were filed, raising
194 claims by companies with offices in the World Trade Center.'
One of the plaintiffs' attorneys contacted all of the others and con-
vened an organizational meeting, which over fifty lawyers attended.
By the time of the first court conference in the litigation, the group
had tentatively formed a plaintiffs' steering committee and designated
a liaison attorney.s At the hearing, the judge expressed a clear pref-
erence for coordination, telling the gathered throng of eighty lawyers,
"We have to have coordination to avoid wasting your time and my
time."86 Among other things, the duplicative papers that would be
generated in the absence of coordination "would be anti-ecological."'
82. This theory is borne out by the arrangement of the South Carolina firm with
its affiliated counsel in the asbestos litigation. See supra note 43 and accompanying
text.
83. Rheingold, Litigation Groups, supra note 42, at 12-13. Mr. Rheingold has
been among plaintiffs' lead counsel in, among others, the Dalkon Shield, MER/29, L-
tryptophan and swine flu litigations.
84. Wise, supra note 50, at 5.
85. Id. at 1.
86. Id.
87. Id.
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The lawyers thus set about finalizing their steering committee plan,
circulating it to all plaintiffs' counsel and submitting it to the court for
approval.88
Notwithstanding the benefits of coordination, plaintiffs' lawyers
usually insist on retaining ultimate control over their individual
cases.89 It is interesting to note that in the asbestos litigation, Plain-
tiffs' Liaison Counsel, which represented roughly 18,000 plaintiffs,
supported multidistrict litigation consolidation of asbestos actions, but
a number of individual plaintiffs' lawyers registered their opposition.90
The tension between efficient coordination and individual case man-
agement results in a litigation control structure that neither forgoes
centralized control nor deprives individual lawyers of the power to
shepherd their own cases. At the hub of the plaintiffs' power struc-
ture, control is tightly held by a small group, in part because "to suc-
ceed, [plaintiffs'] groups need a lawyer or a very small group of
88. Any objector to the plan would be given an opportunity to be heard before the
court approved it. Id. at 5.
The most impressive recent display of coordinated clout in mass tort litigation was
targeted at the tobacco industry. Undeterred by previous setbacks for tobacco plain-
tiffs, a group of powerful plaintiffs' attorneys joined forces to file a products liability
class action on behalf of smokers. Andrew Blum, Tobacco Fight Grows Hotter: An
Alliance of Plaintiffs' Firms Tries New Tactics To Battle Big Tobacco, Nat'l L.J., April
18, 1994, at A6 [hereinafter Blum, Tobacco Fight]; Claudia MacLachlan, Tobacco Foes
Force Industry Showdown, Nat'l LJ, May 2, 1994, at Al, A21; see also David Ranii,
New Group Takes Aim At the Tobacco Industry, Nat'l L.J., Feb. 11, 1985, at 4
(describing formation of an earlier group of tobacco plaintiffs' lawyers). The team
includes many of the nation's leading plaintiffs' lawyers-San Francisco's Melvin
Belli, Louisiana's Wendell Gauthier and Russ Herman, Cincinnati's Stan Chesley, Al-
buquerque's Turner Branch, and Mississippi's Don Barrett. Id.; see also The 1994
Power List, Nat'l L.J., Apr. 4, 1994, at C6, C8 (including Gauthier and Chesley among
the nation's hundred most powerful lawyers). Barrett commented on the significance
of team effort: "The fact that so many of the important plaintiffs' firms nationally
have now joined this fight in my opinion tips the scales in favor of the plaintiffs in
cigarette litigation." Blum, Tobacco Fight, supra, at A7. Each of 40 firms agreed to
contribute $100,000 toward expenses, yielding a plaintiffs' war chest of $4 million.
Andrew Blum, $4M Pledged to Fight Nicotine, Nat'l L.J., May 2, 1994, at A4. The
group is headed by a 12 member Plaintiffs' Executive Committee, chaired by Mr.
Gauthier. Id.
89. See Bromberg & Slowinski, supra note 4, at 385-86; Rheingold, The MER29
Story, supra note 57, at 125; see also Trangsrud, Joinder Alternatives, supra note 4, at
811 ("One impediment to cooperation is the suspicion, many times held by the
widely-dispersed lawyers involved in such cases, that coordination will cause them to
lose control of their cases, lose fees, or suffer professionally."). Thus, plaintiffs'
groups are typically less effective at controlling individual cases than they are at coor-
dinating discovery and disseminating information. See Rheingold, Litigation Groups,
supra note 42, at 3-9.
90. See Case Management: Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, Asbestos Li-
tig. Rep. (Andrews Pubs.), at 22766 (Apr. 5, 1991); Bromberg & Slowinski, supra note
4, at 392. Subsequently, both the Plaintiffs' Steering Committee and the independent
plaintiffs moved unsuccessfully for remand of all the MDL asbestos cases. Bromberg
& Slowinski, supra note 4, at 393. The L-tryptophan litigation similarly saw some
plaintiffs' lawyers oppose both class certification and MDL.
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lawyers with enough driving force to keep the group operating."9'
The tightness of the hub allows for coherent planning, but precludes
detailed control of individual cases. Thus, modem mass tort litigation
frequently sees individual plaintiffs' claims managed by individual
lawyers in close consultation with and by direction from a central or-
gan, such as an ATLA litigation group or a court-appointed steering
committee or lead counsel. 2 Coordination on these terms among the
plaintiffs' bar in mass tort litigation will continue to grow. On this,
both plaintiffs' lawyers93 and defense lawyers94 agree.
3. Equivalence of Litigation Control Structures
What is most interesting about the evolution of litigation control
structures in modem mass tort cases is that plaintiffs' counsel and de-
fense counsel-to the horror of each, perhaps-have come to resem-
ble each other. What once may have been a monolithic defense firm
able to manage every detail of a lawsuit from one location, due to the
necessities of modem multijurisdictional mass tort litigation, has
evolved into a lead counsel with oversight responsibilities for multiple
local counsel. And what once may have been an individual plaintiff's
lawyer with plenary control over an individual client's case, has
evolved due to the very same necessities into one of multiple local
plaintiffs' lawyers handling the details of case management but ac-
cepting information from and oversight by a central organ. In the typ-
ical mass tort litigation, both the plaintiffs and the defense thus
organize themselves in a hub-and-spoke formation. With the involve-
91. Rheingold, Litigation Groups, supra note 42, at 2.
92. A newsletter of the ATLA L-tryptophan Litigation Group described the plain-
tiffs' coordination in that litigation as "the greatest example of information and work
sharing in the history of the United States civil justice system." Introductory Com-
ments, Newsl. of the ATLA L-tryptophan Litig. Group, supra note 77, at 1. While
emphasizing the control and direction of that litigation by the plaintiffs' hub-both
the ATLA litigation group and an MDL Plaintiffs' Steering Committee-the newslet-
ter also makes it clear that each individual plaintiff's lawyer continues to manage each
case. It offers, for example, this warning against relying too heavily on the steering
committee: "Remember-it is the responsibility of individual plaintiff's counsel to
contact and retain experts for all issues!" Discovery, Newsl. of the ATLA L-trypto-
phan Litig. Group, supra note 77, at 4.
93. See, e.g., ATLA Guide to Litigation Groups, Trial, July 1991, at S1, S2 ("Within
the past three years, the number and variety of litigation groups has grown tremen-
dously. New groups are doubtless being formed as you read this. .. ."); Rheingold,
Litigation Groups, supra note 42, at 12 ("[lIt is easy to predict that there will be many
more [successful plaintiffs' groups] in the near future."); Troutwine, supra note 51, at
25 ("Working together and fully sharing research and discovery lend another futuris-
tic element to this litigation. Indeed, cooperation must become more common as we
enter the next century.").
94. One defense-oriented newsletter, for example, bewailed the fact that manufac-
turers are falling behind the coordinated plaintiffs' bar in product liability litigation,
and that "[tihere can be no doubt that the plaintiffs' bar will continue to become even
more well-coordinated." Malcolm E. Wheeler, Defendants Confront Onerous Pretrial
Tactics, Leader's Product Liab. L. & Strategy, Jan. 1993, at 1, 4.
1995] 100"7
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
ment of a plaintiffs' litigation group, steering committee or other cen-
tral authority, plaintiffs enjoy (or suffer) the same litigation control
structure for centralized strategizing and information-gathering as that
practiced by the defense. And with the involvement of local counsel
in multiple jurisdictions, defendants enjoy (or suffer) the same litiga-
tion control structure for local case management as is practiced by
plaintiffs. As one plaintiffs' lawyer commented, litigation groups cre-
ate "an ad hoc plaintiffs' national law firm.""5
II. THE USE OF DEPOSITION TESTIMONY IN SUBSEQUENT ACTIONS
INVOLVING DIFFERENT PARTIES
The problem with using former testimony, in general, is that it is
hearsay. 96 This is not so, of course, where the former testimony is
used for impeachment as a prior inconsistent statement, 97 or where
the former testimony is offered not for its truth but simply to prove
that it was said, as for example in a witness's subsequent perjury
trial.98 In this Article, however, we concern ourselves with the intro-
duction of former testimony to prove the truth of the matter asserted.
In this context, introduction of the testimony requires a hearsay ex-
ception. Courts, legislators and rulemakers, wary of allowing testi-
mony to be used against a party who cannot cross-examine the
witness, have restricted the use of former testimony to ensure accu-
racy and fairness.
At common law, testimony from a prior proceeding could not be
used unless both the party offering the testimony and the party against
whom the testimony was offered had been parties to-or in privity
with parties to-the prior proceeding. 99 The rule thus encompassed
95. Ranii, Plaintiffs' Bar, supra note 42, at 9.
96. Most courts and commentators today classify former testimony as hearsay, and
treat it within the rubric of exceptions to the rule against hearsay. See, e.g., Dykes v.
Raymark Indus., 801 F.2d 810, 815 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1038 (1987);
Lloyd v. American Export Lines, 580 F.2d 1179, 1184-85 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 969 (1978); see also 2 McCormick, Evidence § 301, at 305 (4th ed. 1992) (classify-
ing former testimony as hearsay, but noting Wigmore's contrary view). Earlier, some
had taken the view that former testimony was non-hearsay because it met the require-
ments of oath and cross-examination. See, e.g., Minneapolis Mill Co. v. Minneapolis
& St. L. Ry., 53 N.W. 639, 642 (Minn. 1892); 5 Wigmore, Evidence § 1370 (Chadbourn
rev. 1974).
97. See Fed. R. Evid. 613. Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(A) goes further,
defining as "not hearsay" a witness's prior inconsistent statement if given under oath
at a proceeding. Thus, the federal rule allows such former testimony of a live witness
to be used as substantive evidence, not merely for impeachment. See Fed. R. Evid.
801(d) advisory committee's note on 1972 Proposed Rules.
98. See State v. Wykert, 199 N.W. 331 (Iowa 1924).
99. E.g., Metropolitan St. Ry. v. Gumby, 99 F. 192, 198 (2d Cir. 1900) (finding no
privity between infant and mother with different causes of action); Atlanta & West
Point R.R. v. Venable, 67 Ga. 697, 700 (1881) (finding privity between mother and
child where both actions arose from common cause); Morgan v. Nichol, 15 L.T.R. 184
(C.P. 1866) (not admitting evidence because father held not to be in privity with son);
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both an opportunity-to-examine component (testimony was usable
only against one who was a party to the prior proceeding) and a mutu-
ality component (testimony was usable only by one who was a party,
and against whom the same testimony could therefore be used). In
time, the mutuality aspect of the common law rule disappeared, but
the rule concerning the party against whom the testimony was offered
remained intact."° In other words, testimony could not be used
against one who was neither a party nor a privy to the prior proceed-
ing, but it did not matter whether the party offering the testimony had
been present in the prior proceeding.' 0' Courts thereafter extended
the rule to allow the use of prior-action testimony against representa-
tives and successors in interest to a prior party.l"a
In federal court, Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(1) and Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 32(a)(4) govern the use of prior-action testi-
mony. The two rules overlap but offer independent bases for the ad-
mission of former testimony. 03 As discussed below, each of these
rules appears to allow the use of prior-action testimony only against
those who were present or in privity with those who were parties to
the prior action. Courts, however, generally allow the use of prior-
action testimony of an unavailable witness'04 as long as there was an
adverse party who had an opportunity and similar motive to develop
or challenge the prior testimony. 05
see Mark Lawrence, Note, The Admissibility of Former Testimony Under Rule
804(b)(1): Defining a Predecessor in Interest, 42 U. Miami L. Rev. 975, 978 & n.13
(1988).
100. See Rumford Chem. Works v. Hygienic Chem. Co., 215 U.S. 156, 160 (1909).
101. See Lawrence, supra note 98, at 979-80.
102. See, e.g., Virginia & W. Va. Coal Co. v. Charles, 251 F. 83, 116-17 (W.D. Va.
1917) (admitting deposition of deceased deponent), aff'd, 254 F. 379 (4th Cir. 1918),
error dismissed, 252 U.S. 569 (1920); see Lawrence, supra note 98, at 980-81.
103. See 4A James W. Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice 1 32.021] (2d ed.
1994); Coffey, supra note 16, at 160.
104. Unavailability under Rule 804 includes, among other things, absence coupled
with inability to compel attendance by process or other reasonable means. Fed. R.
Evid. 804(a). Rule 32's notion of unavailability includes distance greater than 100
miles from the place of trial, and inability to procure attendance by subpoena. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 32(a)(3). Because Rule 32 permits the use of an unavailable witness's deposi-
tion for any purpose but severely limits the use of an available witness's deposition,
that rule functions to a large extent, like Rule 804(b)(1), as a hearsay exception for
the testimony of an unavailable declarant. A deposition of an available witness gen-
erally is usable only for impeachment, Fed. R. Civ. P. 32(a)(1), or as an admission,
Fed. R. Civ. P. 32(a)(2).
105. As Wright and Miller state:
[T]he courts have come increasingly to recognize that the real test is whether
the former testimony was given upon such an issue that the party-opponent
in that case had the same interest and motive in his cross-examination that
the present opponent now has. On this view a deposition may even be of-
fered against one who was not a party to the earlier action if there were
parties to it who had the same interest in cross-examination as the present
party has.
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The issue of prior-action depositions, by definition, arises only if
there is a subsequent action separate from the prior one. Viewed an-
other way, an attempt to use deposition testimony against one who
was not a party to the action in which the deposition was taken neces-
sarily presupposes the existence of a party to the present action who
was not a party to the deposition action. Thus, the issue does not arise
where the claims are part of a single class action.10 6 Nor does it apply
to claims aggregated through joinder under Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 19 and 20, through intervention under Rule 24 or through
consolidation for all purposes under Rule 42. It does not arise where
the prior and subsequent actions have been consolidated for pretrial
purposes by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1407, or where cross-noticing of the deposition has been
accomplished to allow parties to related actions to participate in, ob-
ject to and benefit from the discovery.10 7 In each of these situations,
claims are formally aggregated, at least for purposes of pretrial discov-
ery. A party objecting to the use of a deposition taken within such a
framework cannot properly consider himself a non-party to the action
in which the deposition was taken.
Frequently, however, suits are filed in mass tort litigation that are
not formally aggregated with others. Although a few mass tort litiga-
tions have been allowed to proceed as class actions,"" and the trend
appears to favor increasing use of the device, 10 9 courts overwhelm-
ingly have rejected class certification of mass tort claims." 0 Joinder of
8A Charles A. Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 2150 (2d ed. 1994)
(footnotes omitted); see also Coffey, supra note 16, at 167 ("The predominant view
among federal courts requires only a substantial identity of issues and the presence of
an adversary with the same or a similar motive to cross-examine . . .
106. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.
107. On cross-noticing, see infra text at notes 180-83.
108. E.g., Watson v. Shell Oil Co., 979 F.2d 1014 (5th Cir. 1992) (upholding class
certification in oil refinery explosion litigation), reh'g en banc granted, 990 F.2d 805
(5th Cir. 1993); In re A.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1989) (upholding class
certification in Dalkon Shield litigation); Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., 782 F.2d 468 (5th
Cir. 1986) (affirming certification of an opt-out Rule 23(b)(3) class for injured asbes-
tos workers); In re Asbestos Sch. Litig., 104 F.R.D. 422 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (establishing a
Rule 23(b)(3) national class for school districts claiming asbestos property damage),
vacated in part, aff'd in part sub nom. In re School Asbestos Litig., 789 F.2d 996 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 852 (1986); In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 100
F.R.D. 718 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (certifying nationwide class of Vietnam veterans), man-
damus denied, 725 F.2d 858 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1067 (1984).
109. See A.H. Robins, 880 F.2d at 729-38; M.C.L.3d (Tentative Draft), supra note
46, § 33.242.
110. E.g., In re Northern Dist. of Cal. Dalkon Shield IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 693
F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982) (reversing district court's certification of a Rule 23(b)(1)(B)
mandatory national punitive damages class and statewide compensatory damages
class), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1171 (1983); In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d 1175
(8th Cir.) (reversing district court's certification of a Rule 23(b)(1)(B) no-opt-out
class for everyone seeking damages for injuries from collapse of Kansas City Hyatt
skywalk), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 988 (1982); In re Tetracycline Cases, 107 F.R.D. 719
(W.D. Mo. 1985); see 7B Charles A. Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure
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parties with mass tort claims under Rule 19 or 20 is easier to achieve
than a class action, but accomplishes less because it rarely reaches all
of the parties involved in a mass tort dispute.' The same is true of
Rule 24 intervention." 2 Consolidation pursuant to Rule 42 involves
only actions pending within a single jurisdiction," 3 and therefore is
unlikely to render a dispersed mass tort litigation immune from the
issue of prior-action depositions.
The device most often and most successfully used to achieve formal
aggregation of mass tort claims is multidistrict litigation ("MDL").1 4
Actions consolidated by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation
are treated as one for pretrial purposes, including discovery." 5 There-
fore, MDL consolidation reduces the occasions for the question of the
admissibility of prior-action depositions to arise. Because MDL can-
§§ 1783, 1805 (2d ed. 1986); Complex Litigation Project, supra note 4, at 34-44. But
see Paul D. Rheingold, Tort Class Actions: What They Can and Cannot Achieve, Trial,
Feb. 1990, at 59, 63 (acknowledging setbacks for mass tort class actions, but conclud-
ing that "the trend in the courts seems toward the use of mandatory classes in tort
actions as a means of disposing of mass litigation areas that threaten to clog the
courts").
Much of the reluctance to certify class actions in mass tort cases can be traced to a
comment by the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules in its note on the 1966 amend-
ments to Rule 23:
A "mass accident" resulting in injuries to numerous persons is ordinarily not
appropriate for a class action because of the likelihood that significant ques-
tions, not only of damages but of liability and defenses of liability, would be
present, affecting the individuals in different ways. In these circumstances
an action conducted nominally as a class action would degenerate in practice
into multiple lawsuits separately tried.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) advisory committee's note (1966). For an account of the
discussions leading to this position by the Advisory Committee, see Resnik, supra
note 1, at 7-16.
Plaintiffs' lawyers themselves sometimes oppose class certification. A chairperson
of the L-tryptophan plaintiffs' group, for example, filed an affidavit opposing Rule
23(b)(3) class certification: "The associated group of plaintiffs' counsel representing
tryptophan victims have voted, without dissent, to favor voluntary organization of
these suits and to eschew a class action as adding an unnecessary layer of organiza-
tion." Affidavit of Paul D. Rheingold at 2, Rapoport v. Showa Denko America, Inc.,
No. JH-90-518, (D. Md. Aug. 28, 1990).
111. See Complex Litigation Project, supra note 4, at 31-33. Given the dispersal of
most mass tort claims, the requirement that joined parties satisfy jurisdiction and
venue requirements dooms such joinder to incompleteness.
112. See id. at 33-35.
113. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(a). Interjurisdictional consolidation is possible by Rule
42(a) consolidation following venue transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1404 or 28 U.S.C.
§ 1406. More likely and more appropriately, interjurisdictional consolidation is
achieved by the MDL mechanism pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407.
114. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407; Complex Litigation Project, supra note 4, at 28-31;
Schotland, supra note 11, at 22; Trangsrud, Joinder Alternatives, supra note 4, at 803-
09. Mass tort litigations consolidated for MDL handling include In re Asbestos Prods.
Liab. Litig., Nos. 875, C-92-3137-DI, C-92-2930-DLJ, C-92-2929-DU, 1993 WIL
463301, at *1 (J.P.M.L., Nov. 2, 1993); In re Silicone Gel Breast Implants Prods. Liab.
Litig., 793 F. Supp. 1098 (J.P.M.L. 1992); In re A.H. Robins Co. "Dalkon Shield" IUD
Prods. Liab. Litig., 406 F. Supp. 540 (J.P.M.L. 1975).
115. 28 U.S.C. § 1407.
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not reach state court actions, however, and because MDL may include
actions filed after an important deposition has been taken," 6 the issue
sometimes arises even in mass tort litigation consolidated under
§ 1407. In sum, the issue may come up with regard to mass tort litiga-
tion where there has been no formal aggregation, cases outside the
jurisdiction where there has been intrajurisdictional consolidation,
state cases where MDL consolidation of federal cases has been or-
dered, and cases filed after the relevant discovery has been taken.' 1 7
A. Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(1)
1. Statutory Language and Legislative History
In looking for a hearsay exception, we naturally turn first to the
Federal Rules of Evidence. Rule 804(b)(1) excepts certain former tes-
timony from the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable:
Testimony given as a witness at another hearing of the same or a
different proceeding, or in a deposition taken in compliance with
law in the course of the same or another proceeding, if the party
against whom the testimony is now offered, or, in a civil action or
proceeding, a predecessor in interest, had an opportunity and simi-
116. On the other hand, a court may order that discovery already taken in the
MDL shall be available and usable in "tag-along" cases, i.e., cases filed after the initial
MDL consolidation and then transferred into the MDL. See M.C.L.3d (Tentative
Draft), supra note 46, § 31.132.
117. The issue of prior-action depositions in mass tort cases will arise less often if
the American Law Institute's recent complex litigation proposals become law. See
Complex Litigation Project, supra note 4, at 340-44. The proposals won final ap-
proval at the American Law Institute's 1993 annual meeting. See ALl Finishes Com-
plex Litigation Project, Makes Progress on Various Restatements, 61 U.S.L.W. 2709
(May 25, 1993).
The ALI's Complex Litigation Project suggests a comprehensive system, based
largely on the existing MDL model, for aggregation of multiparty, multiforum actions.
The proposals extend beyond current aggregation mechanisms in that, among other
things, they would allow intersystem consolidation. Thus, they would allow in appro-
priate cases transfer from state court to federal court, from federal court to state
court, or from one state to another. See Complex Litigation Project, supra note 4, at
539-674; Symposium, American Law Institute Complex Litigation Project, 54 La. L.
Rev. 835 (1994) (discussing a number of the Complex Litigation Project's proposed
reforms). Some have commented, however, that Congress "is not likely to enact [the
ALI proposals] in the foreseeable future." William W Schwarzer et al., Judicial Feder-
alism in Action: Coordination of Litigation in State and Federal Courts, 78 Va. L. Rev.
1689, 1699 (1992); see also Linda S. Mullenix, Unfinished Symphony: The Complex
Litigation Project Rests, 54 La. L. Rev. 977, 977 (1994) ("[T]he Complex Litigation
Project seems destined to represent a massive, engaging intellectual exercise rather
than a pragmatic blueprint that Congress will enact for the conduct of complex
litigation.").
A more modest proposal, the Uniform Transfer of Litigation Act (UTLA), may
enjoy a greater chance of passage than the ALI's rather revolutionary suggestions.
See Edward H. Cooper, Interstate Consolidation: A Comparison of the ALl Project
with the Uniform Transfer of Litigation Act, 54 La. L. Rev. 897, 898 (1994). The
UTLA, by allowing greater consolidation of related cases, would likewise reduce the
occasions for addressing the issue of prior-action depositions.
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lar motive to develop the testimony by direct, cross, or redirect
examination. 18
The rule's language seems clear enough. It appears to say that the
former testimony hearsay exception applies "if the party against
whom the testimony is now offered, or... a predecessor in interest"" 9
had the chance to examine the witness. "Predecessor in interest," by
usual definition, means one who precedes another in ownership or
control of property.' 20
The rule's legislative history does nothing to undercut the narrow,
privity-focused construction suggested by the rule's "predecessor in
interest" language.' 2 1 As originally promulgated by the Supreme
Court, the rule required only that some litigant at a former proceeding
had a similar motive, interest and opportunity to develop the testi-
mony. It did not require that the party against whom the testimony is
sought to be used, or a predecessor in interest, was present at the for-
mer proceeding. Any party with "motive and interest similar" suf-
ficed. The House of Representatives amended the rule by adding the
"predecessor in interest" requirement, explaining that it would be un-
fair to charge a subsequent party with the possibly inadequate cross-
examination conducted by a prior party's lawyer.22 The Senate ac-
118. Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(1). The former testimony exception was included in Rule
804, which requires unavailability, rather than in Rule 803, which does not require
unavailability, because of the preference for live testimony to allow assessment of
demeanor. See Fed. R. Evid. 804 advisory committee's note. On the preference for
live testimony, the tentative draft Manual for Complex Litigation (Third) notes not
only the inability of jurors to consider a deponent's demeanor, but also the "stultify-
ing effect" that reading deposition testimony can have on jurors. M.C.L.3d (Tentative
Draft), supra note 46, § 22.36.
119. Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(1).
120. Black's Law Dictionary defines "predecessor" as the "correlative of succes-
sor." Black's Law Dictionary 1177 (6th ed. 1990). "Successor in interest," in turn, is
defined as "[o]ne who follows another in ownership or control of property." Id. at
1431. See Acme Printing Ink Co. v. Menard, Inc., 812 F. Supp. 1498, 1523 (E.D. Wis.
1992); Lawrence, supra note 98, at 976 n.7.
121. For fuller discussion of Rule 804(b)(1)'s legislative history, see Glen Weis-
senberger, The Former Testimony Hearsay Exception: A Study in Rulemaking, Judi-
cial Revisionism, and the Separation of Powers, 67 N.C. L. Rev. 295, 298-99, 311-18
(1989); Coffey, supra note 16, at 162-64; Lawrence, supra note 99, at 981-85.
122. The House Committee added the language in italics and omitted the bracketed
language:
(1) Former Testimony. Testimony given as a witness at another hearing of
the same or a different proceeding, or in a deposition taken in compliance
with law in the course of the same or another proceeding, [at the instance of
or against a party with an opportunity to develop the testimony by direct,
cross, or redirect examination, with motive and interest similar to those of
the party against whom now offered.] if the party against whom the testimony
is now offered, or in a civil action or proceeding, a predecessor in interest, had
an opportunity and similar motive to develop the testimony by direct, cross, or
redirect examination.
See 56 F.R.D. 183,321 (1973), Pub. L. No. 93-595,88 Stat. 1926, 1942 (1975), quoted in
Weissenberger, supra note 121, at 313 n.96.
The House Committee's report explained the change:
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
cepted the House amendment but noted, to the dismay and confusion
of future commentators and practitioners, that the Senate did not see
much difference between the Supreme Court version and the House
version.123
2. Judicial Interpretation
The rule's language appears to exclude the use of prior testimony
against one who was neither named nor noticed in the prior action, in
that it requires that the party against whom the testimony is offered,
or a "predecessor in interest," have had an opportunity to develop the
testimony. The courts, however, have not read the rule so literally.
Rather, most have interpreted "predecessor in interest" broadly to
permit the use of former testimony provided the witness was ex-
amined by one whose motive in developing the testimony was similar
to that of the person against whom the testimony is being offered.
12 4
Rule 804(b)(1) as submitted by the Court allowed prior testimony of an un-
available witness to be admissible if the party against whom it is offered or a
person "with motive and interest similar" to his had an opportunity to ex-
amine the witness. The Committee considered that it is generally unfair to
impose upon the party against whom the hearsay evidence is being offered
responsibility for the manner in which the witness was previously handled by
another party. The sole exception to this, in the Committee's view, is when a
party's predecessor in interest in a civil action or proceeding had an opportu-
nity and similar motive to examine the witness. The Committee amended
the Rule to reflect these policy determinations.
H.R. Rep. No. 618, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1975).
123. "Although the committee recognizes considerable merit to the rule submitted
by the Supreme Court, a position which has been advocated by many scholars andjudges, we have concluded that the difference between the two versions is not great
and we accept the House amendment." S. Rep. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 28
(1974). One commentator, emphasizing this legislative history, has decried the "ex-
traordinary judicial manipulation" of Rule 804(b)(1)'s "predecessor in interest" lan-
guage. Weissenberger, supra note 121, at 299.
124. E.g., Dykes v. Raymark Indus., 801 F.2d 810, 816 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied,
481 U.S. 1038 (1987); Hannah v. City of Overland, 795 F.2d 1385, 1390-91 (8th Cir.
1986); Lohrmann v. Pittsburgh Coming Corp., 782 F.2d 1156, 1160-61 (4th Cir. 1986);
Murphy v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 779 F.2d 340, 343-44 (6th Cir. 1985); Clay v. Johns-
Manville Sales Corp., 722 F.2d 1289, 1294-95 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S.
1253 (1984); Lloyd v. American Export Lines, 580 F.2d 1179, 1184-87 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 969 (1978); see also Lawrence, supra note 99, at 977 ("Despite the
term 'predecessor in interest' in Rule 804(b)(1) and the Rule's legislative history,
most federal courts employ analytical approaches that in effect ignore the predeces-
sor-in-interest requirement.") (citation omitted).
The similar motive requirement is by no means an empty one. See United States v.
Taplin, 954 F.2d 1256, 1258-59 (6th Cir. 1992) (rejecting government's use against
defendant of co-defendant's testimony at evidentiary suppression hearing, because
defendant lacked opportunity and motive to develop the co-defendant's testimony);
see also United States v. Salerno, 112 S. Ct. 2503, 2507 (1992) (finding grand jury
testimony inadmissible against government under Rule 804(b)(1) unless defendant
shows government had "similar motive").
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In Dykes v. Raymark Industries,"5 for example, an asbestos plaintiff
sought to use the prior-action deposition of Johns-Manville's former
medical director, Kenneth Smith. 126 The plaintiff sought to use the
deposition against defendant National Gypsum on the issue of the as-
bestos industry's medical knowledge, even though neither the plaintiff
nor National Gypsum had been party to the prior action. The Sixth
Circuit, finding that Johns-Manville was a "predecessor in interest" of
National Gypsum for purposes of Rule 804(b)(1), upheld the deposi-
tion's admissibility. "[P]redecessor in interest is not limited to a legal
relationship, but is also to be determined by... whether the defend-
ant had an opportunity and similar motive to develop the testimony
by cross-examination."' 7
Another court, however, felt constrained by the rule's legislative
history to follow the narrower construction of "predecessor in inter-
est." 28 That court therefore held a prior-action deposition inadmissi-
ble under Rule 804(b)(1), even though a party to the prior action had
a similar motive to examine the witness.129
B. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 32(a)
1. Statutory Language
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 32(a) governs the use of deposi-
tions. That rule allows the in-court use of a deposition under certain
circumstances "against any party who was present or represented at
the taking of the deposition or who had reasonable notice thereof."' 3
A deposition may be used for any purpose if the witness is more than
100 miles from the place of trial or otherwise unavailable.' 3' The last
paragraph of Rule 32(a) specifically addresses the use of prior-action
depositions:
125. 801 F.2d 810 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1038 (1987).
126. For a discussion of Dr. Smith's deposition and its significance in asbestos litiga-
tion, see supra text at notes 22-24.
127. Dykes, 801 F.2d at 816. Other cases allowing under Rule 804(b)(1) the use of
testimony against one who was not a party to the prior action include Clay, 722 F.2d
at 1294-95, and Lloyd, 580 F.2d at 1184-87; see also King v. Armstrong World Indus.,
906 F.2d 1022, 1025-26 (5th Cir. 1990) (admitting prior-action deposition against dif-
ferent party under residual hearsay exception, Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(5)), cert. denied,
500 U.S. 942 (1991); Hannah, 795 F.2d at 1390-91 (interpreting Rule 804(b)(1) to
allow prior testimony against different parties, but denying such use because of dis-
similarity of issues); Lohrmann, 782 F.2d at 1160-61 (same); Murphy, 779 F.2d at 343-
44 (same).
128. Acme Printing Ink Co. v. Menard, Inc., 812 F. Supp. 1498, 1525-26 (E.D. Wis.
1992).
129. Id. at 1526. The court's consideration of Rule 804(b)(1) was superfluous, be-
cause the court admitted the deposition testimony under a broad reading of Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 32(a). See id. at 1522-24; see also infra text at notes 130-34.
130. Fed. R. Civ. P. 32(a).
131. Fed. R. Civ. P. 32(a)(3).
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[W]hen an action has been brought in any court of the United
States or of any State and another action involving the same subject
matter is afterward brought between the same parties or their rep-
resentatives or successors in interest, all depositions lawfully taken
and duly filed in the former action may be used in the latter as if
originally taken therefor. A deposition previously taken may also
be used as permitted by the Federal Rules of Evidence.1 32
Thus, the rule allows a prior-action deposition to be used under the
same conditions as a present-action deposition, 33 as long as the later
action involves the same subject matter and "the same parties or their
representatives or successors in interest.' 34
Rule 32 functions as an independent hearsay exception. "Repre-
sentative" is generally defined as interchangeable with "agent," which
in turn means a person authorized by another to act for that person. 135
"Successor in interest" is generally defined as one who follows an-
other in ownership or control of property. 36
Although Rule 32 purports only to address the use of depositions,
courts have interpreted the rule as covering trial testimony as well. 137
Thus, like Federal Rule of Evidence 804, Rule 32 and its interpretive
case law provide a general framework for introducing former
testimony.
2. Judicial Interpretation
Like Rule 804, the language of Rule 32 suggests a narrow view of
the use of prior-action depositions by limiting such use to subsequent
actions that involve "the same parties or their representatives or suc-
cessors in interest"' 38 and by allowing such use only against one who
was "present or represented at the taking of the deposition or who
had reasonable notice thereof."' 39 Most courts, however, have read
this language broadly to allow the use of depositions where a prior
party had a similar motive to develop or challenge the testimony. 40
The Southern District of New York, for example, has held:
132. Fed. R. Civ. P. 32(a)(4).
133. A present-action deposition is usable for any purpose if the witness is unavail-
able. Fed. R. Civ. P. 32(a)(3). If the witness is available, a deposition generally may
be used only for impeachment or as an admission. Fed. R. Civ. P. 32(a)(1)-(2).
134. Fed. R. Civ. P. 32(a)(4).
135. Acme Printing Ink Co. v. Menard, Inc., 812 F. Supp. 1498, 1523 (E.D. Wis.
1992) (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 676, 32 (5th abr. ed. 1979)).
136. Id. (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 746 (5th abr. ed. 1979)).
137. See, e.g., Castilleja v. Southern Pacific Co., 445 F.2d 183, 186 (5th Cir. 1971)
(comparing depositions and former testimony and finding no distinction under depo-
sition rule).
138. Fed. R. Civ. P. 32.
139. Id.
140. See 4A James W. Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice 32.08 (2d ed. 1994);
Coffey, supra note 16, at 167 ("The predominant view among federal courts requires
only a substantial identity of issues and the presence of an adversary with the same or
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Where depositions and testimony from a prior trial are sought to be
used at a subsequent trial and the issues are substantially the same,
and the interest of the objecting party in the prior action was calcu-
lated to induce equally as thorough a testing by cross-examination,
then the present opponent has had adequate protection for the
same end. 41
Thus, in Ikerd v. Lapworth,42 an automobile accident defendant
was allowed to use against the plaintiff (P2) two depositions from an
action earlier brought against the same defendant by P1, a passenger
in P2's car. P2 objected on the ground that the depositions were taken
before his case was filed, and therefore he had no opportunity to have
his counsel present at the depositions. The court held that "the pres-
ence of an adversary with the same motive to cross-examine the depo-
nent and identity of issues in the case in which the deposition was
taken with the one in which it is sought to be used" satisfied the
rule.143
C. State Analogues
A number of states have enacted rules or statutes governing the
admissibility of former testimony.'" In California, for example, the
a similar motive to cross-examine the witness in order to admit prior action deposi-
tions in a subsequent action.") (footnote omitted).
141. Hertz v. Graham, 23 F.R.D. 17, 22 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
142. 435 F.2d 197 (7th Cir. 1970).
143. Id. at 205. Other cases have similarly allowed deposition use under Rule 32(a)
(or under its predecessor, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(d)) notwithstanding the
absence of the party from the prior action. See, e.g., Rule v. International Ass'n of
Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Ironworkers, Local 396, 568 F.2d 558, 568-69 (8th
Cir. 1977), modified on other grounds, 17 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) § 8409 (8th Cir.
1978); Acme Printing Ink Co. v. Menard, Inc., 812 F. Supp. 1498, 1522-24 (E.D. Wis.
1992); Fullerform Continuous Pipe Corp. v. American Pipe & Constr. Co., 44 F.R.D.
453, 455-56 (D. Ariz. 1968); see also Bankers Trust Co. v. Rhoades, 108 B.R. 423, 430
(S.D.N.Y. 1989) (granting motion to treat prior-action depositions as if taken in pres-
ent action, where non-movants included individual shareholders of corporate party to
prior action), adhered to on reh'g, 111 B.R 54 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); Miwon, U.S.A., Inc. v.
Crawford, 629 F. Supp. 153, 154 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (allowing use of prior-action
deposition where there was substantial overlap of parties to prior and present ac-
tions); George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. State Univ. Constr. Fund, 359 F. Supp. 1037,
1039 (D. Mass. 1973) (denying use of prior-action deposition in absence of showing of
adversary in prior action with like motive to cross-examine), aff'd, 493 F.2d 177 (1st
Cir. 1974). But see Alamo v. Pueblo Int'l Inc., 58 F.R.D. 193, 194-95 (D.P.R. 1972)
(requiring same parties and substantially identical issues).
144. See Alaska R. Evid. 804(b)(1) (1979); 17 Ariz. Rev. Stat. R. Evid., 804(b)(1)
(1977); Ark. Code Ann. Court Rules, Unif. R. Evid. 804(b)(1) (Michie 1976); Cal.
Evid. Code § 1292(3) (West Supp. 1993); Colo. R. Evid. 804(b)(1) (1979); Del. Unif.
R. Evid. 804(b)(1) (1980); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 90.804(2)(a) (Harrison 1979); Haw. R.
Evid. 804(b)(1) (1980); Iowa R. Evid. 804(b)(1) (1983); Me. R. Evid. 804(b)(1) (1975);
Mich. R. Evid. 804(b)(1) (1978); Minn. R. Evid. 804(b)(1) (1977); Neb. Rev. Stat.
§ 27-804(2)(a) (1979); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 51.325 (1971); N.M. R. Evid. 804(b)(1) (1973);
N.C. R. Evid. 804(b)(1) (1983); N.D. R. Evid 804(b)(1) (1977); Ohio Evid. R.
804(B)(1) (1980); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 2804(B)(1) (1980); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann.
§§ 5917, 5934 (Purdon 1982); S.D. Codified Laws § 19-16-30 (1979); Tex. R. Civ. Evid.
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broad interpretation given by federal courts to Rule 804(b)(1) has
been explicitly embraced and codified. Section 1292 of the California
Code of Evidence governs the admissibility of former testimony of-
fered against one who was not a party to the former proceeding. 145
Under section 1292, former testimony may be admissible in a subse-
quent civil action where the declarant is unavailable as a witness and
the issue is such that the party to the action or proceeding in which the
former testimony was given had "the right and opportunity to cross-
examine the declarant with an interest and motive similar to that
which the party against whom the testimony is offered has at the hear-
ing.' 1 46 The California Assembly's commentary on section 1292 ex-
plains that "if one occurrence gives rise to a series of cases involving
one defendant and several plaintiffs, section 1292 permits testimony
given against the plaintiff in the first action to be used against a differ-
ent plaintiff in a subsequent action.' 1 47 The Assembly commentary
justifies the hearsay exception on the ground that "[tihe trustworthi-
ness of the former testimony is sufficiently guaranteed because the
former adverse party had the right and opportunity to cross-examine
the declarant with an interest and motive similar to that of the present
adverse party."'148
Elsewhere, however, proponents of prior-action testimony face a
tougher battle. In New York, depositions taken in prior proceedings
may not be admissible in a subsequent proceeding against a party who
was not represented at or given notice of the prior deposition. The
New York rule requires identity of parties.' 49 The New York rule has
804(b)(1) (1991); Vt. R. Evid. 804(b)(1) (1983); Wash. R. Evid. 804(b)(1) (1978); Wis.
R. Evid. 908.045 (1974); Wyo. R. Evid. 804(b)(1) (1977); see generally 5 John H. Wig-
more, Evidence in Trials at Common Law § 1387 (Supp. 1994) (citing state rules, stat-
utes, and cases governing admissibility of former testimony).
145. "Former testimony" includes "testimony given under oath [in a] deposition
taken in compliance with law in another action." Cal. Evid. Code § 1290(d) (West
Supp. 1993).
146. Cal. Evid. Code § 1292(a)(3) (West Supp. 1993); see Wahlgren v. Coleco In-
dus., 198 Cal. Rptr. 715, 717 (Ct. App. 1984) (holding that depositions of swimming
pool manufacturer's officers, taken in prior unrelated action, were properly excluded
from personal injury action against manufacturer of pool slide, as pool manufacturer
and slide manufacturer did not have similar interests and motives in cross-examining
deponent).
While testimony that meets the requirements of California's section 1292 is not
inadmissible as hearsay simply because it was uttered in a prior action, it may of
course be excluded on other grounds. Generally, "[tihe admissibility of former testi-
mony ... is subject to the same limitations and objections as though the declarant
were testifying at the hearing." Cal. Evid. Code § 1292(b) (West Supp. 1993).
147. Cal. Evid. Code § 1292 (West 1966) cmt.
148. Id.; see also Moore v. American United Life Ins. Co., 197 Cal. Rptr. 878, 889-
90 (Ct. App. 1984) (noting that where party to prior proceeding had significant mo-
tive to cross-examine witness on issues relevant to subsequent action, testimony was
more reliable than most evidence admitted under hearsay rule).
149. See N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. & R. § 3117(c) (McKinney 1991); N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. &
R. § 4517 (McKinney 1992).
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not yet been interpreted to allow the use of a prior deposition when a
party with the same motive and opportunity to cross-examine was
present, although New York case law does not foreclose such an
argument. 50
D. The Fairness Critique and Its Limits
Not everyone agrees with the dominant rule that deposition testi-
mony of an unavailable witness may be used in a subsequent action
against a different party if there was an adversary with opportunity
and the same motive to develop the deponent's testimony in the prior
case. 151 The Ninth Circuit has questioned the fairness of admitting a
deposition against a party that did not participate in the cross-exami-
nation, given "the possibility that the prior opponent mishandled the
cross-examination."' 52 Another court has similarly bemoaned the un-
fairness of allowing deposition testimony from a prior action to be
used against a party that was absent from the prior action and there-
fore lacked opportunity to cross-examine the deponent.15 3
The most thorough and powerful articulation of this critique was
offered by Professor Glen Weissenberger 54 Focusing on Rule
804(b)(1), with particular attention to its legislative history, Professor
Weissenberger posits that the "expansive" approach to the admission
of prior testimony elevates accuracy over fairness and the "restrictive"
approach elevates fairness over accuracy.155 He traces the former tes-
timony exception to its earliest historical origins, and finds fairness
rather than accuracy at the core: "The common-law adversarial sys-
tem championed the axiom that a fair trial required each litigant to be
responsible for the development of his own evidence, and conse-
quently fairness principles of estoppel, rather than accuracy, justified
the earliest receipt of evidence.'15 6 Professor Weissenberger con-
cludes that in enacting Rule 804(b)(1), Congress "elevated policies of
fairness over a prevailing trend toward accuracy," and courts, there-
150. See Healy v. Rennert, 173 N.E.2d 777,779-80 (N.Y. 1961); Overseas Nat'l Air-
ways, Inc. v. General Elec. Co., 462 N.Y.S.2d 984, 988 (Sup. Ct. 1983); In re il of
Goldberg, 582 N.Y.S.2d 617, 619 (Sur. Ct. 1992).
151. On the majority rule, see supra text at notes 124-29, 138-41. This is the test
propounded by and often identified with Dean Wigmore. See 5 John H. Wigmore,
Evidence in Trials at Common Law § 1388, at 111 (Chadbourn ed. 1974); see also
Weissenberger, supra note 121, at 309-11 (discussing Wigmore's central role in liberal-
izing the use of prior-action testimony).
152. Hub v. Sun Valley Co., 682 F.2d 776, 778 n.* (9th Cir. 1982).
153. Alamo v. Pueblo Int'l Inc., 58 F.R.D. 193, 194-95 (D.P.R. 1972).
154. Weissenberger, supra note 121.
155. Id. at 297-98.
156. Id. at 303. "The underlying fairness policy for admitting prior testimony was
expressed in an early common-law rule which required absolute identity of the parties
and issues in the former and the instant litigation." Id. at 306. Although the common
law rule required identity of both parties and therefore encompassed both an oppor-
tunity-to-examine aspect and a mutuality aspect, Professor Veissenberger's fairness
argument is geared primarily to the latter.
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fore, should read the rule narrowly to advance adversarial fairness and
to respect the legislature's wishes.157
This fairness concern sometimes leads a court to deny the use of a
prior-action deposition against one who was not a party to the prior
action.158 The fairness critique is implicit in courts' greater readiness
to allow former testimony into evidence against a party that was also
party to the prior proceeding. 5 9
Embedded in the fairness critique is a powerful assumption worth
revisiting in light of developments in the practice of mass tort litiga-
tion. It is the assumption of litigation control independence. Propo-
nents assume that an individual litigant and his counsel can and should
maintain control over the prosecution or defense of their lawsuit. In
holding that a prior-action deposition was admissible only if the par-
ties were identical, one court declared: "The rule is based on an ele-
mentary principle of justice towards the party against whom the
former deposition is tried to be used."'6 That "elementary principle
of justice," unstated by the court, is the principle that each litigant is
entitled to control his or her own case. If that principle is given pri-
macy, then the possibility that a different party would conduct an ex-
amination differently is dispositive.' 61 The Ninth Circuit explained
the concern well:
157. Id. at 335. Professor Weissenberger does not necessarily reject the possibility
of improving the rule through amendment. Whether amendment would be beneficial
or not, however, he views amendment in the direction of a more expansive approach
as compromising or deemphasizing fairness. Id. at 335-36.
Of course, "fairness" concerns can tip the other way as well. By jeopardizing the
availability of testimony, a narrow reading may deprive a plaintiff or defendant of a
key witness who was available to an earlier plaintiff or defendant, resulting in an
underinformed second verdict and unfairly inconsistent outcomes. Moreover, multi-
ple examinations and cross-examinations inevitably produce misstatements. If a court
allows the use of prior-action testimony against the party that was present in the prior
action but not against the party that was absent, the absent party can avail itself of a
chance favorable misstatement even though the present party would not be allowed
to use favorable testimony from the prior action. In this regard, the fairness issue is
reminiscent of the inconsistent verdict problem in offensive nonmutual issue preclu-
sion. See text infra at note 191.
158. See Alamo v. Pueblo Int'l Inc., 58 F.R.D. 193, 194-95 (D.P.R. 1972); see also
Hub v. Sun Valley Co., 682 F.2d 776, 778 n.* (9th Cir. 1982) (denying use of prior-
action deposition because of dissimilarity of issues, and criticizing cases that allow
introduction of prior-action testimony based on presence of party with similar motive
to cross-examine).
159. See 8A Charles A. Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 2150 (2d ed.
1994) ("Thus, many cases have held that a deposition can be offered against one who
was a party to the former suit even though the party now using the deposition was
not."); Coffey, supra note 16, at 179 ("Courts have admitted almost uniformly deposi-
tions or other former testimony into evidence under rule 32(a)(4) and rule 804(b)(1)
when the parties are situated in either a P2 against D, or D2 against P posture, and
the issues between the former and subsequent actions are substantially the same.").
160. Alamo, 58 F.R.D. at 194-95.
161. Id. at 195 ("Different parties and different issues are crucial circumstances that
inevitably must alter the substance of the deposition taken.").
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Wigmore defends the adequacy of an adversary with the same mo-
tive to cross-examine on the ground that "where the interest of the
person was calculated to induce equally as thorough a testing by
cross-examination, then the present opponent has had adequate
protection for the same end." 5 Wigmore on Evidence § 1388 (4th
ed. 1940). A number of the cases cited in the prior paragraph above
adopt Wigmore's test. We, however, find it troubling. Not only
does the test disregard the "same parties" requirement in Rule
32(a), but it also fails to take into account the possibility that the
prior opponent mishandled the cross-examination. When that has
happened, we question whether the deposition should be admitted
against a party who did not participate in the cross-examination.' 62
In other words, P2 may have handled the cross-examination more
skillfully, more thoroughly, or just plain differently from P1, and it is
P2's prerogative to do so. To deny P2 the opportunity to conduct her
own examination of the deponent, by this view, is to deny P2 a right
that is hers by the very nature of individualistic litigation. 163
It is interesting to trace historically the individualistic system of liti-
gation that is taken for granted by proponents of the fairness critique.
Some trace it to a reaction against the Star Chamber, a powerful Eng-
lish court established in the early sixteenth century." Complainants
before the Star Chamber struggled to win the court's attention. Fre-
quently, they did this by asserting widespread, rather than individual,
harm. In time, the Star Chamber came to be perceived as tyrannical
and abusive. Aiming its substantial power at widespread harm and
disorder, the Chamber functioned as an instrument of sometimes
hasty and unpopular government action, in marked contrast to the
slow, individualized processes of the common law. The Star Cham-
ber's consequent abolition thus coincided with a preference for indi-
vidualized consideration of claims and guarantees of due process."
162. Hub v. Sun Valley Co., 682 F.2d 776, 778 n.* (9th Cir. 1982).
163. This notion of entitlement to individual control over litigation also forms a
basis for the denial of class certification in mass tort cases. See In re L-tryptophan
Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 805, Order No. (D.S.C. Jan. 3, 1992) (denying class
certification because of "the extensive precedent disfavoring use of nationwide class
action device in product liability litigation due to the particularized nature of each
plaintiff's injury, as well as the advanced status of the L-tryptophan cases, and the
evident interest of most litigants in controlling their own lawsuits"); Hobbs v. North-
east Airlines, 50 F.R.D. 76, 79 (E.D. Pa. 1970); Bromberg & Slowinski, supra note 4,
at 410 ("Class certification has also been denied frequently on the ground that since
plaintiffs have a strong interest in controlling their own litigation, other methods of
adjudication, such as individual actions, would be superior."); see generally Trangsrud,
Mass Trials, supra note 4 (arguing, based on the traditional preference for "individual
claim autonomy," that mass trials are unwarranted in mass tort cases).
164. See Bromberg & Slowinski, supra note 4, at 374 n.14; Yeazell, supra note 3, at
49-50.
165. See Yeazell, supra note 3, at 49-50. For an interesting account of the develop-
ment of adversary procedure in the eighteenth century and the rising view of litigants
and counsel as controllers of the adjudicatory process, see Stephan Landsman, The
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The process that is due, or that is assumed to be due by proponents
of the fairness critique, is the process of an individual litigant forging
ahead in an individual lawsuit. As two mass tort litigators have put it,
"The American civil justice system is designed for individual litigation,
and it has traditionally guaranteed each party individually-tailored
due process of law."' 66 Times have changed, however. Although the
Star Chamber has disappeared and plaintiffs need not assert wide-
spread harm, increasingly plaintiffs do assert widespread harm, as
mass tort litigation has taken its place as a significant component of
modern litigation practice. It is a change that necessitates a reassess-
ment of the fairness critique and of the assumption of litigation con-
trol independence embedded therein.
The assumption of litigation control independence is powerful, but
increasingly misguided. In mass tort litigation, at least, communica-
tion and interdependence among same-side litigants have become the
norm. To assume that each party and counsel can and should control
independently every aspect of their case is to ignore the realities of
mass tort practice. 167
Where a litigant in one action is unified with a like-interested liti-
gant in a subsequent action via cooperation and litigation control
structures, the fairness critique against allowing a deposition to be
used against the latter litigant fails except at the highest level of ab-
straction. As described earlier,168 the hub-and-spoke litigation control
structures in mass tort litigation have come to look remarkably similar
for a single defendant and for multiple plaintiffs. Plaintiffs or defend-
ants on the same side of a litigation often work closely together, mak-
ing it reasonable to view the same-side litigants as a unified whole for
purposes of many aspects of adversary fairness.
Mass tort litigation practice thus negates the concern that the ex-
pansive approach to prior-action depositions is anti-adversarial or un-
Rise of the Contentious Spirit: Adversary Procedure in Eighteenth Century England,
75 Cornell L. Rev. 497 (1990).
166. Bromberg & Slowinski, supra note 4, at 374; see also Trangsrud, Joinder Alter-
natives, supra note 4, at 781 (arguing that "uncompromised due process" should pre-
clude joint trials of common issues).
167. The RAND Corporation's Institute for Civil Justice has conducted some fasci-
nating empirical research into perceptions of tort plaintiffs. The findings tend to dis-
prove the myth, implicit in traditional tort approaches, that individual litigants
exercise control over their own cases and that intimate contact and consultation be-
tween lawyers and clients forces lawyers to respond faithfully to their clients' wishes.
See Deborah R. Hensler, Resolving Mass Toxic Torts: Myths and Realities, 1989 U. Ill.
L. Rev. 89, 91-97. The studies show that it is more often the lawyer than the litigant
who chooses to file suit rather than settle without filing-52% of litigants reported
that it was solely or mainly the lawyer's decision, compared with 38% who reported
that it was solely or mainly the litigant's decision. Id. at 94. Fifty-six percent of liti-
gants felt that they had little or no control over how their cases were handled. Id. at
95. While these studies involved non-mass tort cases, plaintiffs in mass tort cases al-
most certainly have even less control and less lawyer contact. Id. at 95-97.
168. See text supra at note 95.
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fair. As a practical matter, holding P2 to a prior-action cross-
examination by a like-motivated attorney for P1, another plaintiff
within the same network, differs little from holding a single defendant
to a prior-action cross-examination by another attorney within the de-
fense network. The link created by a hub-and-spoke litigation control
structure makes it likely that P2's cross-examination would have re-
sembled Pl's, because P2 and P, are working from the same informa-
tion base and are guided by the same general strategy.169 The
"accuracy-fairness polarity," ' in sum, is no polarity at all in the con-
text of a coordinated mass tort litigation.17'
All of this assumes substantial similarity of issues. If the issues in
the subsequent action diverge from those in the prior action, it would
be unfair to use the prior testimony in the subsequent action-
whether or not the parties are the same. Because many issues of cau-
sation and liability are identical among plaintiffs in the same mass tort
litigation, the parties' motives and interests in cross-examining ad-
verse deponents will generally be similar. Where there is a significant
difference in the plaintiffs' cases or in the amount of damages sought,
courts appropriately may find that the plaintiffs' motives and interests
in cross-examining deponents are not sufficiently similar to warrant
allowing the use of prior-action testimony.172 Expert witnesses pres-
ent another circumstance where courts should be reluctant to allow
the use of prior-action testimony. 73
169. Although courts have not appreciated the significant link created by litigation
control structures in modem mass tort cases, in the few non-mass cases where courts
have noted a link between counsel, they have determined that P2's cross-examination
would not have differed materially from PI's. See Rule v. International Ass'n, 568
F.2d 558, 569 (8th Cir. 1977) (involving parties represented by same counsel, with
close interrelationship between parties); Ikerd v. Lapworth, 435 F2d 197, 206 (7th
Cir. 1970) (noting that because counsel for P largely controlled P2's trial, court per-
ceived "no basis upon which it can be assumed that the cross-examination of the de-
ponents would have been any different had [P2's] counsel had the opportunity to
participate therein").
170. Weissenberger, supra note 121, at 299.
171. In the context of aggregation of claims, some have suggested a fairness-effi-
ciency polarity and argued that the efficiency of consolidating claims should not
trump the fairness imperative of individual control over litigation. See, e.g., Trang-
srud, Joinder Alternatives, supra note 4, at 782-83. Others have responded that "[tihe
procedural fairness achieved by processing claims individually may sacrifice the fair-
ness of reaching a just result in a timely fashion." Complex Litigation Project, supra
note 4, at 24. Because efficient joinder can promote consistency of result and fair
division of limited funds, "[f]airess and efficiency therefore are not antithetical, but
in many ways are complementary." ML at 25.
172. See, e.g., Cal. Evid. Code Ann. § 1292 comment of Assembly Committee on
Judiciary (West 1966) ("[flIt can generally be assumed that most prior cross-examina-
tion is adequate if the same stakes are involved .... [If not,] the difference in interest
or motivation would justify exclusion.").
173. In Dykes v. Raymark Indus., 801 F.2d 810, 816 (6th Cir. 1986), discussed in
text supra at notes 125-27, the Sixth Circuit made it clear that it upheld the admissibil-
ity of Dr. Smith's deposition testimony because the testimony related primarily to
historical facts rather than Dr. Smith's expert opinions. "Here, the testimony of Dr.
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E. The Use of Prior-Action Depositions in Modern Mass Tort
Litigation, and Other Implications
Given the weakness of the fairness critique in light of the realities of
modern mass tort practice, it makes particularly good sense in modern
mass tort litigation to follow the rule laid out by the Third Circuit in a
non-mass tort case:
"[I]f it appears that in the former suit a party having a like motive to
cross-examine about the same matters as the present party would
have, was accorded an adequate opportunity for such examination,
the testimony may be received against the present party." Under
these circumstances, the previous party having like motive to de-
velop the testimony about the same material facts is, in the final
analysis, a predecessor in interest to the present party. 174
In applying this rule in mass tort litigation, and especially in determin-
ing whether the previous party had a "like motive" to develop the
testimony, courts should not ignore the litigation control structure em-
ployed by same-side litigants. Parties to different actions, if unified by
the hub-and-spoke structure that is becoming common among plain-
tiffs in mass tort cases, are likely to share a common point of view
regarding a witness's testimony because they share a common strategy
and information base.
This broad approach to admissibility should inform judicial deci-
sion-making at two stages of litigation. Of course, the rule should
govern the admissibility of prior-action deposition testimony when
that testimony is sought to be used and the opposing party objects on
the grounds that the testimony is hearsay or otherwise inadmissible.
Smith is not so much the testimony of any expert who is giving opinions, as it is the
testimony of a very knowledgeable person who was aware of the historical develop-
ment of the specialized subject matter under examination." Id. at 817. The court
explained its reluctance to allow the use of ordinary expert testimony from a prior
action:
[W]e are aware of the great risk which might normally attend the use of a
deposition of an expert who is no longer available for cross-examination.
Expert witnesses all too often may be obtained on any subject and may
speak with great authority and express opinions very wide in scope. When
they are not adequately cross-examined, even though an opportunity is pres-
ent, experts are often prone to create too heavy an aura of authoritativeness.
Further, it should rarely be necessary to use the purely opinion testimony of
an expert who testified in an entirely different case; and the dangers are
correspondingly great that, where there exists a wide variety of opinion, an
alert attorney may simply search out expert testimony which he conceives to
be favorable to his cause and which he knows to have been made by a wit-
ness who is no longer, through death or otherwise, available to testify.
Id. But see Timothy Wilton & Richard P. Campbell, The Admissibility of Prior Testi-
mony of Out-of-Court Experts, 39 Rutgers L. Rev. 111, 115-29 (1986) (arguing that
under certain circumstances, prior-action testimony of unavailable expert witnesses
may be admissible under Fed. R. Civ. P. 32 or Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(1)).
174. Lloyd v. American Export Lines, Inc., 580 F.2d 1179, 1187 (3d Cir.) (quoting
McCormick, Handbook of the Law of Evidence § 256, at 619-20 (2d ed. 1972)), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 969 (1978).
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But the rule also should inform the court's decision at an earlier stage.
When a party seeks to depose a witness who has been deposed previ-
ously in a related case, the opposing party may move to quash the
deposition notice or for a protective order.175 If, under the broad for-
mulation of Rule 32(a) or Rule 804(b)(1), the prior deposition would
be usable in the subsequent action, the court in the subsequent action
should entertain seriously a motion to avoid a repeat deposition of the
same deponent. The test for admissibility-whether there was a like-
interested party at the deposition with similar motive to develop the
testimony-should function well as a test for whether a repeat deposi-
tion is warranted or whether the prior-action deposition suffices.176 If
a subsequent action features factual or legal issues that were absent
from the prior action, or if a party to the subsequent action has inter-
ests that were unrepresented in the prior action, then a repeat deposi-
tion may be required. In such a case, the deposition should be limited
to the necessary supplementation.1l7 Limiting repeat depositions not
only enhances efficiency, but also enhances fairness by removing a po-
tent harassment tool.178 This Article has argued that based on mod-
em litigation control structures and the resulting practical oneness of
a mass tort litigation, a deposition taken in P1's case often can be used
in P2's case as though taken therein.179 By the same reasoning, repeat
depositions sought in a mass tort litigation often can be treated like
duplicative discovery sought within an individual lawsuit.
It might be argued that a rule broadly allowing the use of prior-
action depositions against parties that received no notice of those dep-
ositions would remove incentives to notify related non-parties of dep-
ositions. The rule is unlikely, however, to have that effect. "Cross-
noticing" a deposition in a related case gives parties to that related
case the opportunity to participate in the deposition and therefore
175. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c).
176. This approach is consistent with the recommendation in the first tentative
draft of the new Manual for Complex Litigation, which suggests that counsel and the
court avoid unnecessary depositions by discussing the need for each deposition and by
seeking more economical alternatives. M.C.L.3d (Tentative Draft), supra note 46,
§ 21.45.
177. The draft Manual for Complex litigation (Third) suggests this possibility.
Although it does not mention the broad admissibility of prior-action depositions
under Rule 32(a) or Rule 804(b)(1), the draft suggests that if materials from other
litigation will be usable as evidence in the present litigation, the court may limit par-
ties to supplemental discovery. Id. § 21.425.
178. For example, in a mass tort litigation involving hundreds of independent ac-
tions against one or a few defendants, a defendant's chief executive officer makes an
attractive deponent. Although the CEO's testimony will be usable in each subse-
quent case-even without a broad formulation of Rule 32(a) or Rule 804(b)(1), the
CEO's testimony is admissible against that defendant as a party-opponent's admission
under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2) or comparable state rules-each plaintiff
may seek to depose the CEO in the hope that the defendant will pay more in settle-
ment to avoid the repeated inconvenience of depositions.
179. See text supra at notes 168-74.
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renders the deposition usable in the related case.180 Cross-noticing
forecloses an adversary's argument that it lacked the opportunity to
examine the deponent and that therefore the deposition should not be
usable against it. The rule supported by this Article, in contrast, de-
pends upon a case-by-case determination of whether the issues and
motives are similar enough for admissibility.1 8 1 While it may well be
just "belt and suspenders," good practice will probably continue to
include cross-noticing to the extent practicable whenever a party
wants to insure that a deposition taken in one case will be usable in
related cases or wants to fortify its defense against repeated
depositions. l 2
Frequently, however, cross-noticing is impossible or impracticable.
This happens, of course, whenever a related action is filed subsequent
to the deposition. 8 3 It also may occur when the actions share no
overlapping parties. The parties to P2 v. D2 do not necessarily know in
advance about a particular deposition occurring in P v. D1, even if
they are part of the same mass tort litigation and the same plaintiffs'
and defendants' litigation control structures. Moreover, P and D,
may have no reason to give notice of the deposition to P2 and D2.
Nevertheless, P2 and D2 should be allowed to use the deposition at
trial if the deponent is unavailable, as long as the issues are substan-
tially the same and the adverse party at the deposition had a like mo-
tive to develop the deponent's testimony. It is not that modem mass
tort practice makes each party aware of every deposition taken in
every other case within the litigation. It is rather that modern mass
tort practice gives each party a reasonably representative voice at
those depositions.
The dominant, liberal rule for admissibility of prior-action deposi-
tions has anticipated, in effect, the litigation control structures of mod-
ern mass tort practice. It encourages efficiency and facilitates the
search for truth. Judicial willingness to read expansively the language
180. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 32(a); M.C.L.3d (Tentative Draft), supra note 46, §§ 21.425,
31.14, 31.31.
181. See text supra at note 174.
182. In the L-tryptophan litigation, defense counsel sought to persuade the Food
and Drug Administration ("FDA") to permit depositions of FDA employees, stating
that counsel "will take all steps possible to assure that these witnesses are not sub-
jected to repetitive discovery by cross noticing the depositions.., in all cases that are
not part of the MDL proceeding." Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton v. Depart-
ment of Health & Human Servs., 844 F. Supp. 770, 786 (D.D.C. 1993). Proving that
cross-noticing is no cure-all, however, the FDA denied the request and the court up-
held that denial, in part because it was not clear "how to handle the cross-examination
of 700 plaintiffs in the MDL proceedings, as well as the effect of the proposed deposi-
tion on the 300 state court cases." Id. at 787.
183. The draft Manual for Complex Litigation (Third) raises the question of the use
of depositions against those who become parties to the action after the depositions
have taken place, and suggests that a court may order that the depositions are usable
unless the new parties show cause to the contrary. M.C.L.3d (Tentative Draft), supra
note 46, § 21.453.
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of Rule 32 and Rule 804(b)(1) demonstrates a pragmatic procedural
flexibility that should be encouraged. It is the kind of flexibility urged
by Rule 1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure1" and by the Man-
ual for Complex Litigation.185 And it is the kind of flexibility that
courts must exercise to bridge the gap between fast-developing
changes in law practice and the laborious process of rulemaking.
This is not to say that the rules need no amending. Even if a rule as
written can and should be stretched to accommodate a sensible, prac-
tice-sensitive interpretation, the rule should be reworked if possible to
clarify or ratify the sensible interpretation.' Simply put, the rules
should be amended to correspond with an already sound judicial in-
terpretation. Thus, the courts have first responsibility for ensuring
practice-sensitive procedure when major trends in law practice render
earlier interpretations anachronistic, but the rulemakers are not
thereby relieved of their own responsibility for practice-sensitive
procedure.
In meeting that responsibility as to former testimony, the drafters of
an amended Rule 804 would do well to follow the language used in
Texas:
Hearsay Exceptions. The following are not excluded if the declarant
is unavailable as a witness-
(1) Former Testimony. Testimony given as a witness at another
hearing of the same or a different proceeding, or in a deposition
184. "[These rules] shall be construed and administered to secure the just, speedy,
and inexpensive determination of every action." Fed. R. Civ. P. 1. Cf. United States
v. High Country Broadcasting Co., 3 F.3d 1244 (9th Cir. 1993) (taking Rule I seri-
ously), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 93 (1994).
185. See M.C.L.2d, supra note 10, §§ 20.1, 20.13; M.C.L.3d (Tentative Draft), supra
note 46, §§ 20.1, 20.13, 31.31. The new draft Manual for Complex Litigation recog-
nizes the economies that can be achieved when parties have access to prior-action
depositions, but it mentions only depositions admissible as party-opponent admissions
under Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2) or for impeachment under Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(A),
and not the broader scope of depositions usable pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(1)
and Fed. R. Civ. P. 32(a). M.C.L.3d (Tentative Draft), supra note 46, § 21.455. See
generally Schwarzer et al., supra note 117, at 1749-51 (discussing and commending
cooperation of federal and state courts to create efficiency in mass tort cases, even in
the absence of formal rules for doing so).
186. See Complex Litigation Project, supra note 4, at 9, stating:
Creative lawyers and judges have shown that both justice and efficiency can
be achieved by those willing to stretch the bounds of the existing procedural
scheme to expedite the handling of these [complex litigation] cases. None-
theless, as Congress, the profession, and newspaper journalists have noted,
we are in urgent need of procedural reform to meet the exigencies of the
complex litigation problem.
Without amendment, practitioners unaware of the broad formulation espoused by
most courts may be misled by the current language into thinking that a prior-action
deposition may never be used in the absence of exact identity or formal privity be-
tween prior and present parties. See, e.g., Paul M. Lisnek & Michael J. Kaufman,
Depositions: Procedure, Strategy and Technique § 14.7 (1990) (including successor/
predecessor requirement in discussion of requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 32(a)(4) and
Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(1), with no indication of broad formulation reached by courts).
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taken in the course of another proceeding, if the party against
whom the testimony is now offered, or a person with a similar inter-
est, had an opportunity and similar motive to develop the testimony
by direct, cross, or redirect examination. 18
While there is a strong preference in the law for live testimony, there
is at least an equal preference towards rendering informed decisions
based upon all relevant evidence. Where a witness is unavailable to
tell a story directly to the fact-finder, the Texas rule allows the story to
be told in its prior-action form through deposition transcript (or, as is
increasingly the case, videotape). Because the story must have been
given under oath and subject to similarly motivated cross-examina-
tion, any perceived unfairness is more formal than real.
The implications of the developments in mass tort litigation dis-
cussed in this Article transcend Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(1)
and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 32(a). They extend, for example,
to issues of virtual representation and non-party preclusion.' 88 The
propriety and constitutionality of non-party preclusion and the scope
of offensive nonmutual issue preclusion are beyond the reach of this
Article. Nevertheless, the analysis herein may diminish the argument
against non-party preclusion, given the calls for greater use of offen-
sive nonmutual issue preclusion in mass tort litigation.189 One plain-
tiffs' lawyer who touted the usefulness of offensive nonmutual issue
preclusion in mass tort litigation, suggesting that "the results of the
first tried case might be allowed in some fashion to become binding
precedent for all later cases arising out of the same disaster,"'190 went
on to note that only plaintiffs should be allowed to avail themselves of
the collateral estoppel effect. "To protect the due process right of liti-
gants to a fair opportunity to present their cases, the doctrine at most
187. Tex. R. Civ. Evid. 804(b)(1) (West 1994). Equally apt language is used by
California, Cal. Evid. Code § 1292(3) (West Supp. 1993); Hawaii, Haw. R. Evid.
804(b)(1) (1985); Nebraska, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-804(2)(a) (1989); New Mexico, N.M.
Stat. Ann. § 804(B)(1) (Michie 1978); and Wisconsin, Wis. Stat. Ann. § 908.045(1)
(West 1974).
Texas maintains separate evidentiary rules for criminal cases and for civil cases.
Former testimony is admissible in Texas criminal cases only "if the party against
whom the testimony is now offered, had an opportunity and similar motive to develop
the testimony." Tex. R. Crim. Evid. 804(b)(1) (West 1994). The current federal rule
similarly distinguishes criminal cases from civil by allowing the use of former testi-
mony "if the party against whom the testimony is now offered, or, in a civil action or
proceeding, a predecessor in interest, had an opportunity and similar motive to de-
velop the testimony." Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(1).
188. See generally Robert G. Bone, Rethinking the "Day in Court" Ideal and Non-
party Preclusion, 67 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 193 (1992) (arguing for a broader set of nonparty
preclusion rules); Lawrence C. George, Sweet Uses of Adversity: Parklane Hosiery
and the Collateral Class Action, 32 Stan. L. Rev. 655 (1980) (discussing erosion of the
mutuality doctrine, and logical extension to non-party preclusion).
189. See, e.g., Migues v. Fibreboard Corp., 662 F.2d 1182, 1189 (5th Cir. 1981) (de-
clining to allow offensive nonmutual issue preclusion in asbestos litigation); see
Weber, supra note 40, at 279.
190. Rheingold, Mass Disaster Litigation, supra note 64, at 21.
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would be a one-way street whereby the results would bind only the
common defendant who lost the previous case, after having had his
fair opportunity to be heard."'191
Like the fairness critique against using a prior-action deposition
against a non-party, the due process notion that a judgment does not
bind a non-party is grounded in the assumption of litigation control
independence. As mass tort coordination continues to develop, for-
mally independent litigants come to litigate increasingly as though
they were a single party. It may become necessary to reevaluate
whether due process warrants treating a single mass tort defendant
with a hub-and-spoke litigation structure differently from a group of
coordinated mass tort plaintiffs with a similar hub-and-spoke litigation
structure' 92 for purposes of issue preclusion. 193
The trend toward coordination in mass tort litigation also carries
implications for how rules of civil procedure ought to be structured.
The view expressed in this Article, that the way mass tort litigation is
practiced should inform the construction of Rule 32(a), meshes with
the criticisms lodged against transsubstantive rules' 1 by a number of
proceduralists. 19 If mass tort litigation is practiced differently from
191. Id.
192. On the resemblance of plaintiffs' and defendants' litigation control structures,
see supra part I.B.3.
193. The question of whether it is fair to bind a mass tort defendant with an unfa-
vorable judgment, where the defendant would not be able to bind the mass tort plain-
tiffs were the judgment favorable to the defendant, calls to mind Professor Currie's
famous hypothetical mass tort litigation. See Brainerd Currie, Mutuality of Collateral
Estoppe" Limits of the Bernhard Doctrine, 9 Stan. L. Rev. 281, 285-89 (1957). A
railroad wins the first 25 lawsuits brought by passenger-plaintiffs injured in a train
crash, based on a finding in each case that the defendant railroad was not negligent.
Jury number 26, however, finds the defendant negligent. See id at 285-86. To allow
every plaintiff thereafter to establish negligence through collateral estoppel would be
not only unfair but ridiculous. To some extent, Currie's concern has been addressed
through the presumption against offensive nonmutual issue preclusion where there
are inconsistent judgments. See Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 29(4) (1980)
(listing inconsistent determinations as a circumstance that may justify allowing reiti-
gation of an issue).
194. See supra note 17.
195. See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, Of Rules and Discretion: The Supreme Court,
Federal Rules and Common Law, 63 Notre Dame L. Rev. 693, 716-17 (1988) (advo-
cating view that does not equate uniformity with transsubstantivity); Judith Resnik,
Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 494, 526-27
(1986) (commenting that transsubstantive rules have been undermined); Linda Silber-
man, Judicial Adjuncts Revisited: The Proliferation of Ad Hoc Procedure, 137 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 2131, 2175-78 (1989) (discussing the erosion of the transsubstantive nature of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); Stephen N. Subrin, Federal Rules, Local Rules,
and State Rules: Uniformity, Divergence, and Emerging Procedural Patterns, 137 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 1999, 2042-43, 2048-51 (1989) (advocating tailoring of procedural rules);
Howard M. Erichson, Note, Nationwide Personal Jurisdiction in All Federal Question
Cases: A New Rule 4, 64 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1117, 1158-59 (1989) (arguing that nation-
wide personal jurisdiction proposal reflects a shift toward more rational transsubstan-
tiveness). But see Paul D. Carrington, Making Rules to Dispose of Manifestly
Unfounded Assertions: An Exorcism of the Bogy of Non-Trans-Substantive Rules of
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other types of cases-and especially if the assumption of litigation
control independence holds truer in other areas than in mass tort liti-
gation-then perhaps procedural and evidentiary rules should be dif-
ferent in, say, a landlord-tenant case or automobile accident case than
in an asbestosis case. On the particular issue of prior-action deposi-
tions, this need may be met by a single carefully drafted rule' 96 or by
appropriately crafted judicial language' 97 that can mandate case-by-
case analysis of whether the prior and subsequent parties' interests
and motives were sufficiently similar. Nevertheless, the peculiarities
of modern mass tort litigation practice and their procedural implica-
tions suggest the potential usefulness of non-transsubstantive rules of
procedure.
CONCLUSION
Practitioners of modern mass tort litigation-on either side of the
caption-do not view each plaintiff's action in isolation. Even in the
absence of any formal judicial aggregation, each plaintiff's case is, by
the nature of mass tort litigation, intertwined with others. Counsel
have adapted to the collective nature of such litigation by coordinat-
ing their efforts. Over the last several decades, same-side counsel in
mass tort litigation have become increasingly interdependent, and
their joint efforts have become increasingly structured. Plaintiffs'
counsel, in particular, have developed mechanisms for rapid collection
and dissemination of information, joint strategic planning, centralized
legal and factual research, master pleadings, trial-ready packets of
documents, schools for training individual lawyers how to try the
cases, and other pieces of a coordinated tort prosecution. In some
cases, the hub-and-spoke litigation control structure of a large number
of formally independent plaintiffs, each with separate counsel but with
central planning and information sharing by a litigation group or
steering committee, has come to bear a remarkable resemblance to
the hub-and-spoke structure established by a single major defendant,
with lead counsel at the hub but with much day-to-day case manage-
ment handled by dispersed local counsel.
This Article has examined the possibility of taking into account the
practical interdependence that occurs among formally independent lit-
igants. Consideration of the admissibility of prior-action depositions
demonstrates the fruitfulness of allowing the realities of counsel coor-
dination to inform procedural decision-making. Some courts and
commentators favor a narrow reading of Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
Civil Procedure, 137 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2067, 2068-69 (1989) (arguing that critique on
transsubstantive rules is misguided); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Discovery Vices and
Trans-Substantive Virtues in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. Pa. L. Rev.
2237, 2244-47 (1989) (same).
196. See text supra at note 184.
197. See text supra at note 174.
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dure 32(a) and Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(1). They suggest that
a prior-action deposition should not be admitted against one who was
not formally a party or privy to the prior action, because it is unfair to
bind a non-party with testimony he did not have the opportunity to
cross-examine. This view, however, assumes an independence of liti-
gation control that is belied-at least in the area of mass tort litiga-
tion, where the issue of prior-action depositions often arises-by the
trend toward structured coordination by same-side counsel. Thus, the
broader view, which allows the use of prior-action depositions as long
as there was a like-interested party to the prior action with an oppor-
tunity and similar motive to develop the testimony, better comports
with the way mass tort litigation is practiced.
One risk of practice-sensitive procedure is that it may become self-
fulfilling. If procedural decision-making assumes coordinated prac-
tice, then practitioners may find themselves forced to coordinate-
compulsory joinder of counsel, if you will-even where their clients'
interests otherwise would suggest going it alone. Procedural rules, af-
ter all, are both descriptive and prescriptive, both reactive and proac-
tive. This Article has focused on the descriptive, reactive aspect in
urging that rules take into account the realities of law practice. But
the prescriptive aspect of rules makes us wary. While coordination
among same-side counsel has much to commend it, we do not neces-
sarily suggest in this Article that rules be designed specifically to fos-
ter such interdependence. Rather, we observe interdependence of
same-side counsel as an established fact in the world of modem mass
tort litigation. Because it is already here, we suggest that it not be
ignored.
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